


A SHRINKING ARMY IN EUROPE: CAN THE US ACHIEVE ITS MILITARY
STRATEGIC GOALS WITHOUT IT?



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2014-01

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

A SHRINKING ARMY IN EUROPE : CAN THE US ACHIEVE ITS MILITARY STRATEGIC GOALS WITHOUT IT?, by Major P. Christian Schleider, 120 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army in Europe (USAREUR) has reduced its size from over 213,000 soldiers at its height in 1989 to less than 32,000 today. Defense spending cuts required by the Budget Control Act are forcing the Army to reduce the total number of active duty soldiers in the Army and rethink its overseas basing strategy. The Cold War is over and deactivating units in Europe seems tempting considering the high costs incurred from operating overseas. This study determines whether or not the US can accomplish its military strategic goals in Europe as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review without USAREUR's organic brigade combat teams and support units, and instead rely on regionally aligned forces, European militaries, or other the other service components in Europe.

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ACRONYMS

1AD	1st Armor Division
AFEUR	Air Forces Europe
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
ARFORGEN	Army Forces Generation
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
BCT	Brigade Combat Teams
BDE	Brigade
BN	Battalion
CAB	Combat Aviation Brigade
CAS	Close Air Support
CAV	Cavalry
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSIS	Center for International Strategic Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
ECOMIL	Economic Community of West African States Military
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	European Defense Agency

EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
EUFOR	European Union Peacekeeping Forces
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISR	Information Surveillance and Reconnaissance Assets
ISS	European Union Institute for Strategic Studies
JMTC	Joint Multinational Training Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
MAREUR	Marine Forces Europe
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MI BDE	Military Intelligence Brigade
MND	Multinational Division
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVEUR	Navy Force Europe
NRF	NATO Response Force
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces

RIA	Roberts International Airport
RRF	NATO Rapid Reaction Forces
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SCR	Stryker Cavalry Regiment
SFJ	Steadfast Jazz
SFOR	NATO Stability Forces
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SNMCMG	Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group
SNMG	Standing NATO Maritime Group
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SPMAGTF	Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
UAS	Unmanned Aerial Systems
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCC	Unified Combatant Commands
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	US Army in Europe
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The US Army has maintained a constant presence in Europe since World War II. Its mission evolved when the Iron Curtain fell in Central Europe, and endured through the Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. However, these wars are over and many argue that the US Army's stay in Europe should draw to a close.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army Europe (USAREUR) reduced its size from over 213,000 Soldiers at its height in 1989 to less than 32,000 today. In 2012, the Army cut more of its troop strength in Europe reducing the total number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) down to two. Defense spending cuts required by the Budget Control Act (sequestration) forced the Army to reduce the total number of active duty soldiers in the Army by almost 20 percent, meaning many more BCTs will be deactivated across the Army.¹ USAREUR may have to reduce its presence in Europe even further.

From a congressional standpoint, the Cold War is over and cutting units in Europe seems tempting, considering the high costs incurred from operating overseas. The Army recently developed a new strategy that aligns US-based forces to geographic locations called regional alignment.² The regionally aligned forces can then be temporarily rotated

¹Tan Michelle, "Rapid Response Force Stands up in Europe," *Army Times*, October 14, 2013.

²Patrick Bremser, *2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Irregular Warfare Center, 2013). 2/1ID completed first rotation to the Horn of Africa early 2013.

from the US to other places, including Europe. Because of this new strategy, the need to maintain Army units in Europe is questionable.

In the fall of 2011, the Obama administration announced that the US would shift its strategic military focus to Asia and the Pacific. The latest US strategy “pivots” defense priorities towards Asia, while sequestration simultaneously forces a reduction in defense spending. Many question whether or not the US should maintain forces in Europe. In 2012, DOD strategic guidance determined that Europe is a provider of defense and not a consumer of it.³ However, European militaries are shrinking in response to sovereign debt crises. Over the next 10 years, Germany will reduce its defense spending by 25 percent; Britain and France will reduce theirs by almost 10 percent.⁴ Many defense analysts in both Europe and America believe that there is little coordination between EU and NATO members on how they cut their budgets. Therefore, Europe might be losing critical capabilities needed to operate beyond their borders.

Some defense experts believe that NATO and the EU’s ability to project power beyond the Mediterranean is uncertain for the next 10 years.⁵ This presents a problem because Europe’s backyard still contains significant threats, primarily in the Levant, North Africa, and the Caucasus. Furthermore, Russia, with Vladimir Putin at its head, “has emerged as a born-again 19th-century power determined to challenge the

³Department of Defense, *Strategic Guidance - Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 1.

⁴F. Stephen Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), ix.

⁵Ibid., xvi.

intellectual, moral and institutional foundations of the [European] order” through its actions in Georgia and Syria.⁶ How will these developments impact the future of USAREUR?

The primary research question evolves from these trends: can the US accomplish its military strategic goals in Europe as outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) without USAREUR’s organic brigade combat teams and support units? In other words, USAREUR’s composition would mirror other Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) without permanently assigned units. In order to frame the main research question better, there are several secondary questions that must be answered:

1. How do US Army units in Europe contribute to the fulfillment of QDR goals?
2. Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR’s brigade combat teams and support units?
3. Can EUCOM’s other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR’s brigade combat teams and support units?
4. Can the US Army use regionally aligned forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals?

What exactly is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and where does it come from? The QDR is a legislatively mandated review of DOD strategy and priorities that is generated by the Secretary of Defense as a report to congress every four years.⁷ The QDR

⁶Ivan Krastev, founding board member of the European Council of Foreign Relations.

⁷Department Of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), www.dod.gov (accessed October 10, 2013).

is the Secretary of Defense's guidance to US national military forces on priority defense missions based on the President's National Security Strategy. It must address the strategic environment for next 20 years, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and the budget plan.⁸ The most recent QDR was released in February of 2010, and the next QDR will be released sometime in 2014. Meeting the QDR's guidance is an essential task that the military must complete. The QDR narrows its focus into regional objectives, and divides the world into six regions, known as areas of responsibility (AOR). This study extracts the US's primary objectives in the EUCOM AOR from the QDR and uses these objectives as the basis for analysis. The EUCOM AOR includes the entire continent of Europe, consisting of 51 countries and territories and extending from Greenland to Israel.

The QDR outlines five purposes for a robust U.S. military presence in Europe⁹:

1. Deter the political intimidation of allies and partners.
2. Promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions.
3. Demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies.
4. Build trust and goodwill among host nations.
5. Facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both

inside and outside the continent.

In order to better analyze the QDR's guidance that pertains to the EUCOM AOR, this study divides the objectives into two major categories: war/conflict goals and ongoing peacetime goals. What are the peacetime tasks that the QDR states EUCOM

⁸Ibid., 65.

⁹Ibid.

must accomplish? What are the tasks that EUCOM must be prepared to do in areas of likely conflict? The QDR outlines two major security tasks for US forces in Europe: Promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea Regions, and to facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. These security tasks require some form of power projection. The QDR specifically states that the US no longer needs to defend Europe, especially when looking through the lens of traditional conflict between nations. The Cold War is over and the Soviet Union no longer exists. NATO and its members define the current security environment of the Euro-Atlantic Area as a low conventional threat environment.¹⁰ If the security issues are outside of Europe, why should the US continue to maintain forces there?

Security following the collapse of the Soviet Union primarily centers on issues rather than aggression from nation states.¹¹ The newest problem affecting European security comes from non-state actors.¹² Globalization creates less governable world systems, allowing non-state actors to fill the vacuum of power, especially in unstable regions. Non-state actors include non-governmental organizations, some of which are beneficial, but they also include terrorist, extremist, and criminal organizations. Many of these directly affect the safety of Europe within its borders. Their actions are difficult to

¹⁰NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Lisbon: NATO, 2010), 10-13.

¹¹Andreas Staab, *The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact*, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 129.

¹²Ibid.

predict with various motivation and capabilities leading to uncertain groups of adversaries.

Globalization draws zones of instability closer to Europe. Traditional borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant and security within Europe has more to do now with its adjacent neighborhoods than its individual countries. Unstable regions therefore directly affect Europe in ways that they never have before. These zones of instability around Europe create several security problems including regional conflicts, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, religious tension, piracy, and competition over natural resources.¹³

Regional instability also affects the ability to protect people from weapons of mass destruction. NATO's Strategic Concept 2010 identified the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as an acute threat in areas of ongoing conflict or unstable security situations.¹⁴ This means that rogue and non-state actors will have a much easier time acquiring these capabilities.

Security and defense in Europe, although significantly changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, still remains in the best interests of the US. The topic of this study determines whether or not the US Army needs a land power presence in Europe to meet the security goals outlined in the QDR.

¹³Antonio Missiroli, "Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities 2013-2025 Challenges and Avenues Report," 16 (May 2013): 17-18; Luke Coffey, "The Future of U.S. Bases in Europe: A View from America" (lecture, Baltic Defense College, Tartu, Estonia, June 12, 2013).

¹⁴NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 10-13.

Definition of Key Terms

Crisis Management: NATO defines crisis management as one of its fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to respond to a threat, be it in a national or an international situation.¹⁵

European Defense Agency: EDA's mission is to support the EU Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the European Union's defense capabilities for the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This means running and supporting cooperative European defense projects; supporting research and technology development; boosting the European defense technological and industrial base; and providing a forum for European Ministries of Defense. EDA is one of the youngest European Union Agencies. It works on the basis of a new approach, tailored to the military needs of tomorrow, providing different and often innovative solutions.¹⁶

NATO: NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. Politically, NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict. NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty - NATO's founding treaty - or under a UN mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations. NATO also provides for

¹⁵NATO, "Crisis Management," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-EFD8E438-22FC1F50/natolive/topics_49192.htm (accessed October 10, 2013).

¹⁶European Defense Agency, "About Us," <http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/who-we-are> (accessed October 10, 2013).

the collective defense of its member nations under Article 5 NATO consists of 28 member countries, 7 of which provide for 80 percent of its defense spending: Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, and Poland.¹⁷

The European Union: The European Union is a supranational and intergovernmental union, economic and political partnership between 28 European countries. It has delivered half a century of peace, stability, and prosperity. Its member states have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level.¹⁸

Assumptions

This research assumes several policies, facts, and conditions will remain unchanged over the next 10 years. First, US and European defense budgets will continue to decline over the next decade. Second, the US will be able to project combat power to the extent that it has been able to for the last 20 years. Third, the EU will continue to consolidate and pool its military resources and NATO will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Finally, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus regions will continue to face conflict and instability.

¹⁷Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, ix.

¹⁸European Union, “How the EU Works,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm (accessed November 14, 2013).

Limitations

The biggest limitation to this thesis is the frequently changing political and security environments in the EU, NATO, and the US. The thesis will be limited to an analysis of the security situation in and around the Black Sea Region and the Mediterranean Littoral over the next 10 years. The quickly changing security environment in the Mediterranean makes it difficult to forecast likely areas of conflict. Additionally, the thesis will use entirely unclassified data. Finally, the information cutoff of the research was February 28, 2014. The thesis therefore does not take into consideration the new QDR that was released in March 2014.

Significance

The objective of the study is a cost to benefit analysis to determine whether or not the strategic and operational benefits of having Army forces in USAREUR outweigh the financial costs of maintaining those forces overseas. The significance of the thesis is reflected in the hypothesis that USAREUR might not need to maintain units forward stationed in Europe. The results could have an impact on whether or not the Army maintains units in Europe. Even if the Army maintains units in Europe, it could affect which types of units are selected to remain. In the findings portion of this paper, clear recommendations will be made as to whether or not units need to remain and how to make those units more relevant and ready for use by the EUCOM commander.

Summary and Conclusion

The latest US strategy “pivots” defense priorities towards Asia, while sequestration simultaneously forces a dramatic reduction in defense spending. Shifting

the defense focus to Asia requires that European allies assume much of the burden of security around their neighborhood, specifically in Africa, the Middle East, and the eastern periphery of Europe. However, Europe is still recovering from a significant financial crisis and many European militaries were forced to cut a significant amount from defense spending. Although the US fares better than European economies, the sequester has forced significant budget cuts across the US military, especially in the Army. As the US Army is forced to contract, units stationed in Europe present likely targets for elimination due to the high cost of operating overseas.

USAREUR faces serious challenges over the next 10 years that directly impact readiness and relevance of its forces. These challenges include a shift in strategic focus from enduring threats around Europe, fewer training opportunities, and relevance compared to its height during the Cold War. Additionally, fiscal challenges in America might lead to fewer and less capable forces abroad, forcing Europe to take the lead in defense.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of chapter 2 is to frame the primary research question and evaluate the existing literature surrounding the research topic. The primary research question asks whether or not the US can accomplish its military strategic goals in Europe as outlined in the QDR without USAREUR's organic combat and combat support units. In an effort to structure the research, the first part of this chapter explains where USAREUR fits in with US defense initiatives in Europe. Specifically, it describes US military assets in Europe and reviews the literature surrounding the future of the Army in Europe. This portion of the chapter concludes that the shifting of US strategic priorities to Asia in combination with a reduction of defense spending will alter the US military presence in Europe.

The second section of the literature review focuses on the secondary research question that asks whether or not US allies in Europe can help achieve the QDR goals without US land power present on the continent. The forces that are currently providing security and defense in Europe include the units within USAREUR, EUCOM, NATO, the EU, and the individual militaries of European countries. This section describes European defense and its complexities in order to determine whether or not the US Army can assist in the collective defense of Europe.

The third section of the literature review evaluates the different schools of thought regarding the necessary levels of US land power in Europe. There are three major schools of thought. First, the US should increase the number of US Army units in Europe. Second, the US should maintain the status quo and keep the current number of US Army

units and its footprint on the continent intact. The final school of thought believes that the US Army can reduce or even eliminate the US Army presence in Europe.

USAREUR and Shifting US Defense Initiatives

The first section of the literature review describes the makeup of USAREUR, how it fits into European defense, and the trends that are causing it to change. USAREUR reports to US European Command (EUCOM), which is the primary executor of the QDR's guidance for the European region. EUCOM, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is one of six regional Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) and is composed of forces from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Special Operations. EUCOM provides command and control of U.S. military forces in both peacetime and wartime within the European Area of Responsibility (AOR). A four star General or Admiral, known as a combatant commander (CCDR), commands EUCOM while simultaneously serving as the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) for all NATO forces.

EUCOM commands the following service component commands and forces:

1. Air Forces Europe (AFEUR) consists of Third Air Force based in Ramstein, Germany
2. Marine Forces Europe (MAREUR)- consists of the Black Sea Rotational Force, based in Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania¹⁹, Task Force 62 (Rotational Marine

¹⁹Black Sea Rotational Force Factsheet Marine's black Sea force: "Black Sea Rotational Force is a Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force deployed to the Black Sea, Balkan, and Caucasus regions of Eastern Europe to participate in security cooperation, to strengthen partner military capacity, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis response to nations in the region." Staged along the Black Sea in Romania, the force usually consists of 250-350 marines. Conducts majority of Marine Forces Europe security cooperation, including Georgia and the Caucasus region. Additionally supports EUCOM crisis response including NEO and humanitarian assistance.

Expeditionary Unit), Special Marine Air Ground Task Force in Spain (SP-MAGTF Crisis Response).²⁰

3. Navy Force Europe (NAVEUR) - commands US Navy 6th fleet based out of Naples, Italy. A rotational Marine Expeditionary Unit remains with this fleet.
4. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) – located in Stuttgart, Germany. SOCEUR commands special operations forces units within the AOR including the USAF 352nd Special Operations Group, Naval Special Warfare Unit 2, and 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces.
5. US Army Forces Europe (USAREUR) headquartered in Mannheim, Germany, controls all Army forces in the EUCOM AOR.



Figure 1. EUCOM Area of Responsibility

Source: EUCOM, “The EUCOM Region,” <http://www.eucom.mil/mission/the-region/overview> (accessed March 7, 2014).

²⁰Marine Corps Communication, *Current News Playbook* (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Communication, 2013), 72.

USAREUR is the Army Service Component Command responsible for unified land operations in the European AOR and is responsible for providing title 10 forces to both EUCOM and AFRICOM. The USAREUR footprint today is about 50 percent smaller compared to ten years ago. USAREUR possesses very little combat power compared to its height in the cold war, to the point that it may not have much effect on the battlefield when deployed in a major conflict. Currently, the US plans to reduce the number of US soldiers in Europe down to 30,000 with only 7-10 bases in operation.²¹ As of January 2014, USAREUR's unit structure includes a logistics command that enables theater opening (21st Theater Support Command), two combat brigades (2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and 173rd Airborne Brigade), 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 5th Signal Command, 7th US Army Joint Multinational Training Command, NATO Brigade (a headquarters unit that supports the US mission to NATO), and the rotational units in the multi-national Battle Group East operating in Kosovo.²²

Since Operation Desert Storm, the US Army deployed units from Europe as part of its response to conflict.²³ US Army Europe units were among the first deployed to locations in Europe and the Middle East and conducted offensive and stability operations,

²¹USAREUR, "US Army Europe Factsheet," <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/factsheets/default.htm> (accessed Sepetember 4, 2013).

²²USAREUR, "US Army Europe Organization Chart," <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization> (accessed September 4,2013).

²³VII Corps from USAREUR was the primary force employed during Desert Storm.

and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.²⁴ Additionally, the US Army supported the vast majority of NATO operations with units from Europe.²⁵

Two major trends affect the future of USAREUR - the pivot of strategic focus to the Pacific and Asia and the budget sequester. In late 2011, the administration indicated that the US would expand its role in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁶ Known as the pivot to the Pacific, the Obama administration elected this path to counter China's influence as a regional power, deepen US credibility abroad, and protect and supervise trade routes within the region.²⁷ However, many argue that the "pivot" might produce a reduction of military capacity in the other areas of the world, especially when this strategy takes into account the decreasing US defense budget.

In addition to the "pivot," the budget sequester has the potential to generate a large impact on the US Army in Europe. The sequester forces the Army to shrink, and in the process creates several other problems. In particular, it forces the restructuring of Army units, disrupts the current strategy of readiness (Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN), and impacts major weapons systems programs. Once the conflict in Afghanistan concludes, some believe that the era of large-scale conventional wars is over

²⁴USAREUR, "US Army Europe History," <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/history.htm#desert> (accessed Sepetember 4, 2013). USAREUR units were among the first conventional units deployed during Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

²⁵Ibid., Task Force Eagle.

²⁶Mark E. Manyin et al., *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2.

²⁷Ibid.

and question the importance of allocating increasingly scarce resources to large land forces.²⁸ One of the ways the Army seeks to ensure relevance and capability is to create a smaller, more mobile, and regionally focused Army. Proponents of this strategy believe that regionally aligned forces could address commitments to NATO allies and other US partners by rotating Army units from the US.²⁹ The US recently announced that it would allocate a US based heavy brigade to the NATO response force and rotate US-based units to participate in training exercises.³⁰ Because of these trends, USAREUR units and capabilities experience ongoing change through 2016, as the Army reduces its footprint in Europe.³¹

European Defense And The Next Decade

The second portion of the literature review attempts to better frame the secondary research question that asks whether or not US allies in Europe can help achieve QDR goals without US land power present on the continent. This section describes European defense and its complexities in order to determine ways in which the US Army assists in the collective defense of Europe.

²⁸Nathan Frier, *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), vi; Michael Shurkin, *Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity British, French, and German Experiences* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 1.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2013), 2.

³¹Ibid., 15-16.

The United States' European policies have had a profound effect on European defense. The US presence in Europe since WWII allowed European nations to cut back on defense expenditures, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. The final area of the literature review researched focused on answering the secondary research question, determining whether or not US allies achieve are capable of achieving the goals outlined in the QDR without US land power. Therefore, this section of the literature review evaluates the state of European defense for the next ten years. The research included official sources and studies, books, and think tanks. In order to narrow the scope of the study and focus the research, the literature review in chapter 2 and the analysis in chapter 4 center on the countries and defense organizations that are capable of force projection. Since this literature review focuses on rapid response forces, then the primary analysis of European defense initiatives includes capabilities, power projection, readiness, and national policy (financial and willingness).

The most powerful components of European defense include two major multinational defense organizations (NATO and the military of the EU) and several individual countries capable of some level of combat power projection (Great Britain, France, and Germany). NATO is the primary venue for defense cooperation in Europe, whereas the EU's military arm is newer, but quickly gaining more importance.³² The scope of the research has been narrowed from including the entire array of forces available to European nations in a time where territorial defense is required and instead focuses on forces capable of rapid response (or force projection).

³²NATO's responsibilities arose from Collective European and US Defense against the Soviet Union following WWII.

Several official sources were included in both the literature review and the case studies, and included *NATO Strategy 2010*, NATO's 2010 *Strategic Concept for Defense and Security*, EU and NATO official websites, and several factsheets accessed from government websites. In addition to official sources, several studies and reports proved particularly insightful and helped to frame the research questions and case studies. The primary sources for schools of thought regarding defense and security include the RAND Corporation, The Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), The EU Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), and several MMAS theses from Command and General Staff College students. Specifically, the key works in the field include a 2012 study conducted by the RAND Corporation that addresses current trends of European Defense.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 to counter the Soviet threat in Europe. NATO developed its most recent strategy late in 2010. The strategy discusses NATO's core tasks and principles, defines the security environment, the importance of defense and deterrence, and crisis management. NATO's core tenents remain collective defense of participating nations, crisis management, and cooperative security.³³ The current environment is much different from what it was during the cold war. NATO defines the security environment in Europe as low threat.³⁴ However, this conclusion is reached with some cautions attached. Due to globalization and the

³³NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78125.htm> (accessed November 14, 2013), 12.

³⁴Ibid.

instability of regions around Europe, NATO members see the defense of Europe not just as the collective defense of European countries against an external threat, but also as the management of crises outside of Europe.³⁵

NATO also believes that some of its member nations will become more reliant on foreign energy and those energy supplies will be increasingly threatened as the security environment around Europe continues to evolve. Additionally, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in Europe's eastern neighborhood threatens global stability.³⁶ Because of the constantly changing security environment, NATO emphasized the importance of maintaining military capabilities and responsive forces through difficult financial times.

NATO response forces consist of a response package of up a brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and their supporting elements; a maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG); a combat air and air-support component; Special Operations Forces; and a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense task force.³⁷ NATO also maintains access to French, German, and British Rapid Response Forces. Each country also retains a battlegroup or brigade sized force capable of rapidly deploying to a theater and operating from 30 days to a year.

³⁵Ministere de la Defense, “European Defense,” <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/portail-defense/international2/europe-of-defence/european-defence> (accessed February 28, 2014).

³⁶NATO, *Strategic Concept*, 12.

³⁷NATO, “The NATO Response Force,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed February 20, 2014).

The European Union

The European Union evolved from several economic and political treaties meant to encourage free trade and spur economic growth. In 1993, founding European nations signed the Maastricht Treaty and brought the EU into formal existence.³⁸ The treaty outlined three pillars of legal cooperation that included reforms on economics, security, and justice systems. The EU's Foreign and Security Policy was one of these three pillars and represented the beginning of the EU's entry into international security and defense.

In 1999, after a failed military response in the Balkans, the EU developed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which eventually led to the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA).³⁹ The EDA focuses on unifying European defense acquisition efforts, pooling resources, and determining capability gaps. A recent ISS report (*Enabling the Future: European Military Capabilities 2013-2025*) indicated the strengths of consolidating security cooperation within the EU, and touted the capabilities within the new agencies including the European Defense Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).⁴⁰ ISS identified that the EU and its

³⁸EU, “How the EU Works,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm (accessed March 8, 2014).

³⁹Gjorgi J. Vasilevski, “European Union’s Military Crisis Management: Challenges and Perspectives” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2012), 10.

⁴⁰International Institute for Strategic Studies, “About ISIS,” <http://www.isis.org> (accessed November 14, 2013). ISIS is a government-run think-tank that focuses on security studies in and around the EU.

member states would continue to play an increasing role in international affairs and in peace-building operations.⁴¹

The EU's desires to generate a military arm have often been overshadowed by NATO. This is partly because NATO's role in European defense has been clearly defined for the past 60 years, whereas the EU's role is less certain and often subject to a NATO-led decision.⁴² The 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defense policy defined and consolidated the EU-NATO strategic partnership. The declaration confirms that NATO remains the foundation for collective defense of its members, but that a stronger European (EU) role in crisis management will contribute to the goals of NATO. The agreement, known as the "Berlin-plus" agreement, establishes a comprehensive framework of practical cooperation in the field of crisis management.⁴³ However, if no agreement is attained, unified effort will be difficult to attain due to arguments and negotiations over responsibilities and strategies.⁴⁴ This encourages both NATO and the EU to maintain separate rapid response forces.

In order to address its need for rapid response forces, the European Union commissioned EU battlegroups. Each battlegroup is a combined arms, battalion-sized force (1500 troops) reinforced with combat support elements. The battlegroups are

⁴¹ Antonio Missiroli, "Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities 2013-2025 Challenges and Avenues Report," no. 16 (May 2013): 17-18.

⁴² F. Stephen Larrabee, "The United States and the European Security and Defense Policy: Old Fears and New Approaches," *Strategic Yearbook 2006, European Security and Defense Policy* (2006): 177-78.

⁴³ Vasilevski, "EU Military Crisis Management," 44.

⁴⁴ Staab, *EU Explained*, 135.

formed either by a framework nation or developed in partnership. They are designed to be fully complementary with NATO and its response force. The battlegroups allow the EU to undertake autonomous rapid response operations either for stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations.⁴⁵ The primary missions for these response forces include humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.⁴⁶

However, the EU still has a long way before it can independently run military operations without having to rely on outside assistance. The EU's battlegroups are only suited for military crisis management rather than high intensity offensive and defensive military operations conducted in a combat environment.⁴⁷ After the recent economic crisis, the EU will not increase their military expenditures to build forces capable of acting independently of NATO. The best solution for the EU is to extend its strategic partnership with NATO, since collective security should remain the responsibility of NATO.⁴⁸ However, NATO didn't weather the financial crisis of the past decade unscathed.

⁴⁵European Union, *The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell: European Union Factsheet* (European Union, 2005), http://europa.eu/publications/libraries-archives/index_en.htm (accessed November 14, 2013).

⁴⁶Staab, *EU Explained*, 133.

⁴⁷Vasilevski, "EU Military Crisis Management," 69.

⁴⁸Ibid., 70.

Financial Crisis And its Impact On European Defense

The recent financial crisis significantly affected the whole of European Defense. A study conducted by CSIS in 2011 analyzed the specific impacts and examined how the global financial crises affect Europe's ability to maintain its defense contributions to NATO. The average European nation cut around 10 percent of defense spending each year over the last decade.⁴⁹ If the defense cuts persist, Europe will be less capable, less willing, and less interested partner in US security and defense endeavors.⁵⁰

As Europe's population ages and unemployment remains high, economists forecast sustainability gaps forcing GDP growth potential to remain at around 1.7 percent for the next 20 years. Furthermore, instability within the Eurozone, if unchecked, could increase the risk of another double dip recession. This will undoubtedly force military spending cuts to levels lower than the treaty requirements of NATO and the EU. Europe's militaries already suffer from over two decades of under-funding following the collapse of the Soviet Union and hard use from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further cuts will reduce both capabilities and readiness and limit force modernization.⁵¹

The RAND Corporation describes this challenge in *RAND and the Challenges of NATO Austerity*. The report evaluated NATO and the seven largest European militaries including Great Britain, France, and Germany. The RAND study analyzed the state of readiness of European defense forces and concluded that the majority of Europe's

⁴⁹ Stephen J. Flanagan, *A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 10.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., VI-VII.

militaries suffer from a lack of funding and a lack of direction.⁵² Based on the current level of defense cuts across NATO, if one of these nations is operating in a theater like Afghanistan, they will not have the capability to operate in the other.⁵³ It also indicated that a reduction in spending directly affects readiness, warning that only 10 percent of Europe's military is capable of deploying (1.7 million total).⁵⁴ All of these factors will have a significant impact on Europe's military capabilities for the next decade. Moreover, as each NATO member continues to downsize their militaries, they do so in a disorganized manner to the point where they may lose some key capabilities, calling into question the readiness of NATO for the next ten years.

European Capabilities and Power Projection

As each European nation cuts military spending, military leaders are most concerned about the loss of capabilities and the ability project forces forward. ISS indicated that both the number of and type of operations that Europe was engaged in, combined with fiscal constraint, place a large strain on military capabilities. It also underscored that Europe's defense equipment market is heavily fragmented and that cross-nation coordination and capabilities remained relatively weak.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the

⁵²Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, 28.

⁵³Larrabee, *US and the European Security and Defense Policy*, 177-178.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Missiroli, "Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities," 5.

report cast doubt on whether or not the EU or NATO would be capable of responding to likely and anticipated threats within the next ten years.⁵⁶

The degree of type of capability loss varies for each European nation. European nations tend to duplicate capabilities primarily because the European defense market is fragmented and each nation protects its domestic industrial bases.⁵⁷ Currently, the British Army doesn't have expeditionary units capable of deploying or sustaining main battle tanks and will have to rely on France or Germany for support, although the UK is working to reorganize its land forces into a single division.⁵⁸ As for the UK and French amphibious capabilities, it is highly unlikely that they would be deployed in a high-threat environment without considerable U.S. force protection or capability augmentation.⁵⁹ NATO also has a problem keeping mission enablers vice major combat systems and it seems increasingly certain based on the campaign in Libya that NATO cannot provide its own enablers for missions.⁶⁰

The defense cuts and financial constraints will limit the capacity of the major European nations to project military power in the next decade. NATO power projection outside of Europe's immediate neighborhood will be particularly difficult due to reduced force size, limited lift and logistics capability, and lack of certain key enablers (e.g., ISR,

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Flanagan, *A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership?*, 11.

⁵⁸Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, 28.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

missile defense, UAVs).⁶¹ The naval forces of the major European naval powers will radically shrink as well.⁶²

However, the primary areas of concern in Europe's militaries are in regards to strategic lift and transport.⁶³ One of the most critical issues that NATO faces is a projected shortage of cargo aircraft in the NATO airlift fleet by the end of the decade. The NATO Europe airlift fleet will consist of a mix of over 100 operational A400Ms, a handful of UK and NATO C-17s, C-130s, and C-295s. This suggests that one or two BCT-sized forces could be sustained by NATO Europe without U.S. Air Force assistance.⁶⁴ Of all NATO Europe, only Germany, France, and the UK will have forces that could be moved relatively quickly by air, sea, and ground lift to the threatened eastern periphery of NATO⁶⁵

There are significant military capability gaps between NATO's European nations and the US. Although major European militaries attempted to transform their militaries as the US has done over the past 15 years, the development of military capabilities has slowed. Based on the current levels of spending, many believe that these capability gaps are widening instead of closing (see figure below).⁶⁶ NATO Europe had significant

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., 32.

⁶³Larrabee, *US and the European Security and Defense Policy*, 177-178.

⁶⁴Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, 32-33.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Terry Terriff, Frans P. B. Osinga, and Theo Farrell, eds., *A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 187-90.

problems sustaining the 2010 Libyan campaign, revealing that even the strongest European militaries lacked key capabilities.⁶⁷




Figure 2. Defense Spending Comparison

Source: Ministere de la Defense, *Defense Key Figures 2013* (Paris, France: Ministere de la Defense, 2013), 21.

One of the major solutions to mitigate capability-loss and power projection limitations involves a concept known as *burden sharing*.⁶⁸ Burden sharing among allies is the primary method of meeting allied agreements and preventing capability gaps in European defense. However, burden sharing must be coordinated at NATO and EU levels to prevent uneven loss in capabilities.

⁶⁷Clark A. Murdoch, Kelley Sayler, and Kevin Kallmyer, *Defense in an Age of Austerity* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 8.

⁶⁸Ibid.

The Challenges Ahead

The challenge in Europe's security future involves politics and national will as much as military capability. CSIS determined that not only are allied capabilities decreasing but there is a declining allied consensus as to what the threats are to Europe.⁶⁹

The difficulties of gaining a consensus among European nations for military intervention might be problematic. The 2011 Libyan operation demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining a NATO-wide consensus regarding a humanitarian intervention. "In the future, any such intervention is likely to be a coalition operation involving some, but not all NATO allies—perhaps without a formal NATO decision by the North Atlantic Council."⁷⁰

EU led operations might also prove even more difficult to initiate. As of now, the EU is relatively slow moving compared to NATO, requiring a coalition to be formed prior to action. Furthermore, stronger EU militaries such as Germany and France might be losing influence due to the increasing number of EU member nations in the EU.

The US led Global War on Terror and the Iraq Wars significantly eroded positive evaluations about NATO. Future efforts led by the US will be significantly complicated by a marked decrease in NATO based defense action.⁷¹ If the US leads coalitions, then it is more important to identify allies who are willing to fight in places the US cares about than to find partners that have supported US led coalitions in the past. In the past twenty

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, 8.

⁷¹Leonard Ray and Gregory Johnston, "European Anti-Americanism and Choices for a European Defense Policy," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40, no. 1 (January 2007): 85-91.

years, the only European nation that generally shares the US global perspective is Great Britain.⁷² The US must identify capability gaps within its allies and opportunities to pool and share resources.⁷³ However, there are US allies in Europe that are incapable of shifting defense spending in order to pool assets and the US should only conduct burden sharing missions where cooperation is very likely.⁷⁴

In conclusion, the major European military force that can best assist in the accomplishment of QDR goals is NATO Europe, not the EU's military arm. However, budget constraints in Europe may place key elements of defense, in particular force projection, in jeopardy. The burden-sharing concept mitigates some of the capability loss from budget cuts, but it may not be sufficiently coordinated within NATO. Based on a cursory look at NATO and Europe's militaries, most don't really seem to require a large US land force presence in Europe. The majority of their needs come in the requirement of forces that enable force projection, high tech enablers, and logistics.

How USAREUR Might Change In The Coming Years

There are three major schools of thought regarding the necessary levels of troop strength that the US Army should maintain in Europe. The first school of thought views the current number of soldiers in Europe as sufficient to meet the US strategic goals there. The second school of thought sees the current level of soldiers as too small and encourages returning to a higher number of land forces, in particular armored brigade

⁷²Murdoch et al., *Defense in an Age of Austerity*, 8.

⁷³Ibid., 10.

⁷⁴Ibid.

combat teams. The third school of thought believes that the threats in Europe are all but gone and encourages reducing both the number of troops and the number of Army bases to save money.

The predominant strategy encourages the DOD to maintain the current level of US Army soldiers in Europe. Those that support it cite several reasons for their line of thinking. First, the current number of bases and army personnel permits the US to project power where it's needed both within Europe and its immediate neighborhoods. Basing strategists claim the most important capabilities to maintain in Europe are mobility bases, force projection assets, communication infrastructures, and major medical support facilities.⁷⁵ Forward basing of force projection capabilities and units provides US decision makers flexible and responsive military options to help defend American interests both in and around Europe.⁷⁶ USAREUR's 21st Theater Sustainment Command provides EUCOM the ability to assure strategic access both within and beyond its footprint.⁷⁷

Second, proponents of this strategy argue that smaller reaction forces and forward deployed US enablers are more important to facilitate European led operations than forward deployed brigade combat teams. USAREUR provided key enablers including intelligence and communication support to both EUCOM and NATO partners during

⁷⁵ Michael J. Lostumbo et al., *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 291.

⁷⁶ Coffey, "The Future of U.S. Bases in Europe."

⁷⁷ Lieutenant General Mark P. Hertling, "The US Army in Europe: Fighting above Our Weight Class," *Army*, October, 2011, 105-108.

operations in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa, so keeping these enabling type units might be what is really needed.⁷⁸ Basing experts believe that the key focus should be to address crisis response, instead of large armored forces, so keeping smaller rapid reaction forces like the 173rd company strike force, the Marines SPMAGTF-CR, and special operations forces allows gives the US quick and flexible options in times of crisis.⁷⁹

Third, Europe's current strategic environment is much different from what it was during the cold war. NATO currently defines the security environment in Europe as low threat.⁸⁰ Due to globalization and the instability of regions around Europe, NATO members now see the defense of Europe not just as the collective defense of European countries against a nation state threat, but also as the management of crises outside of the Europe.⁸¹ Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, experts argue that there is limited need to deter a large nation state from aggressive acts.⁸² Moreover, proponents argue that the current force laydown of USAREUR effectively meets this requirement with the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command and the two brigade combat teams in Europe.⁸³

Finally, this school of thought believes that the primary purpose of the USAREUR is to build interoperability with NATO allies and thereby increase alliance

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Lostumbo, *Overseas Basing of US Military Forces*, 291.

⁸⁰NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*.

⁸¹*European Defense*, Ministere de la Defense, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/portail-defense/international2/europe-of-defence/european-defence> (accessed March 7, 2014).

⁸²Lostumbo, *Overseas Basing of US Military Forces*, 291.

⁸³Hertling, “Fighting above our Weight Class,” 105-108.

cohesion, and to train partners through security cooperation activities.⁸⁴ Therefore, one of the most important missions that USAREUR has is to operate the Joint Multinational Training Facility in Hohenfels, Germany.

The second school of thought places more emphasis on land power and recommends an increase in the size of the US Army's footprint in Europe, primarily the number of armor brigade combat teams. Proponents of increasing the size of USAREUR also see that it is critical to maintain bases to project power and to build interoperability with NATO allies, but feel that these things alone are not sufficient to meet US interests. They state three main reasons why it's important to maintain a larger footprint in Europe - deterrence of threatening nation states, the potential for instability outside the region to affect Europe, and Europe's need for US support in order to secure the continent.

Some argue that a stronger US Army presence in Europe deters potential adversaries from attacking.⁸⁵ A strategy based on deterrence seeks to both avoid war and counter a potential enemy attack. The basic premise is that an adversary, primarily a nation state, will not attack if the defenders can either defeat the attack or inflict such a high number of casualties that the payoff is not worth the effort.⁸⁶ The case that proponents of a stronger US Army presence in Europe make is that it is very dangerous to reject a deterrence strategy where it is badly needed even if deterrence is an expensive

⁸⁴John R. Deni, *The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in Europe* (Washington, DC: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), viii; Hertling, 105-108.

⁸⁵Richard K. Betts, "The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can-And Can't-Do Now," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March/April, 2013): 87-99.

⁸⁶Ibid.

ambition. Failed deterrence in one area of the world, creates a ripple effect and detracts from US efforts at deterring others, for example North Korea and Iran.⁸⁷

The second main reason why many believe that the size of USAREUR should increase is that Europe is geographically situated in a manner where instability can easily spread from neighboring countries. Based on the close economic ties between the US and Europe, instability in Europe does not align with US interests. The most likely areas of continuing or future instability in the world include Africa, the Levant, the Middle East, and the Caucasus: all regions within Europe's immediate backyard.⁸⁸

Proponents of an increased US presence in Europe believe that Europe's eastern neighborhood, which consists of the Caucasus, the Levant, and the Middle East, is highly unstable from the ongoing crises stemming from the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War. The Arab Spring revealed that the Middle East's authoritarian regimes would have a difficult time operating in the foreseeable future. Egypt is still reeling from fallout of the Arab Spring. Their military deals with ongoing riots and anarchy after recently overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood-backed government. Syria, supported by Russia, is engaged in a civil war. These conflicts create regional instability that affects Turkey, Iraq, and Israel. Unless the outcome of these incidents is decided relatively soon, they will likely contribute to additional instability and conflict.⁸⁹ Syria is a breeding ground for Muslim extremist and terrorist groups. In January of 2013, Israeli air strikes targeted

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸J. Joseph Hewitt, *Peace and Conflict 2012* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, 2012), 9.

⁸⁹*Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012), xiv.

Russian weapons systems inside Syria that were believed to be going to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria has been a long-time arms provider to the militant Lebanese organization. The ongoing instability from the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War has created a volatile and unpredictable Mediterranean region that has the potential to affect the Suez Canal. The canal is vital to Europe's economy and enabling the transport of 10 percent of the world's sea trade and almost all of Chinese goods to Europe.⁹⁰

Another reason that some argue for an increased presence is that Europe's southern neighborhood, Africa, remains the most unpredictable continent in the world, containing 75 percent of the most volatile countries listed on the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger. These instable locations are prime breeding locations for terrorism and crime as is evident by operations in Somali and the Maghreb. Ongoing humanitarian crises emerge despite the maturing of many African governments. Within the next 10 years, the potential for conflict to occur in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to remain high despite African governments moving to a more intermediate age structure. The chance for crisis occurs because of the large number of disenfranchised ethnic and tribal minorities and insufficient natural resources, in particular water and arable land.⁹¹ These factors dramatically increase the probability of a humanitarian crises and conflicts involving humanitarian rights violations.

Overall, instability of Europe's eastern and southern neighborhoods affects European economic prosperity and threatens critical infrastructures overseas: affecting

⁹⁰Suez Canal Authority, "About the Suez Canal," <http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=17> (accessed January 2, 2014).

⁹¹*Global Trends 2030*, viii.

global trade, costs, and time. Proponents of a increased Army presence in Europe argue that a larger force forward deployed gives the US a flexible ability to respond to a wide range of uncertain events, and there are those that believe that European militaries will struggle without a large US land force located in Europe.⁹²

The final school of thought believes that a reduction in the number of soldiers in US Army Europe is the best choice to meet US interests in a time of declining resources. There are several reasons to back this line of thinking. First, Europe is viewed as a low threat area and this does not justify maintaining a large US Army footprint there. Second, removing US troops from European bases would spur US allies to take on more of a fair share of the cost burden of defense. Third, keeping US Army forces in the US is cheaper, it makes it easier to deploy to global hot spots, and provides better training opportunities than maintaining a large Army presence in Europe.

When compared to the strategic importance of Army units during the Cold War, it is hard to make an argument to justify much more than the current level of US soldiers in Europe. Russia is now far less capable than NATO is, and the majority of former Warsaw Pact nations now belong to NATO.⁹³ The old power balance is now completely lopsided. For all intents and purposes, NATO is more of a threat to Russia than Russia is to NATO. Some believe that a reduction of US forces in Europe might indicate that the US does not mean to go to war unless it truly must.⁹⁴ Shifting resources away from Europe would

⁹²Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, xi; Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 87-99.

⁹³Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 87-99.

⁹⁴Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 1 (January/February, 2013): 116-28; Frier, vii.

allow the US to focus its efforts on only the most pressing international threats, thereby preserving the country's combat power and security over the long run.⁹⁵ Therefore, proponents of a smaller US Army footprint in Europe believe that it is necessary to close forward bases and send US soldiers back to the US.

Those that believe the US Army presence in Europe should be smaller also postulate that removing large numbers of US soldiers from forward bases incentivizes US allies in Europe to spend more on defense. The US spends 4.6 percent of gross domestic product on defense whereas NATO allies collectively spend only 1.6 percent of gross domestic product on defense.⁹⁶ Since the US keeps large numbers of US soldiers in Europe, NATO allies are less inclined to spend their budgets on defense. Removing US soldiers from Europe would encourage US allies to spend more on defense, taking up a fair share of the burden.

The cost of maintaining US forces overseas in Europe is much higher than maintaining soldiers in the US. Each service member stationed in Europe costs up to \$40,000 more per year versus a soldier in the US. Additionally, the cost of maintaining bases in Europe is much higher since real estate is limited and expensive. Therefore removing US Army soldiers corrects the perceived imbalance and encourages more burden sharing.⁹⁷

Finally, many argue that pulling Army soldiers back to the US creates better training opportunities, faster deployments, and allows the US to conserve combat power

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Deni, *The Future of American Landpower*, 1.

to influence global hot spots.⁹⁸ Military training in Europe is more difficult than military training in the US. Flying hour restrictions impede night training for helicopters; limited ranges and training area make it difficult for artillery, infantry, and armor units to maintain proficiency. Additionally, deploying Army units forward in Europe is not that much faster at projecting power. Deploying an armored brigade combat team from Germany to Kuwait takes around 18 days, which is only 4 days shorter than deploying it from the US.⁹⁹

In summary, the schools of thought surrounding the issue of USAREUR leave ample room for research regarding which school might actually prove right. A further analysis of European defense capabilities helps to determine which school of thought might be correct.

Summary and Conclusions

In conclusion, the literature surrounding the research topic reveals that the “pivot” of strategic priorities in combination with the budget sequestration will likely continue to shrink the US footprint in Europe over the next decade. This likelihood will force the US to implement a rotational unit concept, utilize other assets in EUCOM, and rely on its allies to provide security in and around Europe. However, European militaries might not be able to provide much security around Europe due to limits in force projection. European ground forces will be limited to the deployment of battalion and brigade sized battle groups rather than full-strength divisions and corps. Furthermore, countries from

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Lostumbo, *Overseas Basing of US Military Forces*, 291.

the EU and NATO are slashing defense budgets dramatically and with limited coordination between the individual nations. Although NATO has several response forces, their readiness, capabilities, and resolve might be questionable for at least the next 5-10 years.¹⁰⁰ Even more worrisome is that many European countries might not be willing to commit forces to NATO-led operations, as occurred during the NATO response in Libya.¹⁰¹

In this field of study, further research is warranted regarding the strategic impacts of the “pivot” and whether or not the US will be able to accomplish the specific defense goals outlined in the QDR. There seems to be little research about whether or nor the US should maintain Army units in Europe. An in-depth analysis should provide new thought on these issues, and provide some benefit to the US Army and EUCOM. The research contained in this study, keying off patterns and gaps in the current literature, will provide an initial assessment of the plausibility and utility of such further research.

¹⁰⁰Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity*, ix.

¹⁰¹Ray and Johnston, “European Anti-Americanism,” 85-91. This study indicates that GWOT and Iraq Wars have significantly eroded positive evaluations about NATO and future efforts led by the US will be significantly complicated by a marked decrease in NATO based defense action

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the research is to determine whether or not the US can accomplish its military strategic goals in Europe as outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units. Chapter 3 outlines the steps taken by the researcher to obtain necessary data and information and describes the research methodology in detail.

The primary focus of the research and analysis is to answer the secondary research questions. Four secondary questions support answering the primary research question:

1. How do US Army units in Europe contribute to the fulfillment of QDR goals?
2. Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units?
3. Can EUCOM's other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units?
4. Can the US Army use regionally aligned forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals in Europe?

In order to answer the secondary research questions, this study utilizes a comparative case study analysis of several military events and their outcomes. The analysis applies “structured, focused comparison” to cases in order to answer the secondary research questions.¹⁰² The researcher assigned variables in order to enable this

¹⁰² Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Harvard, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67-73.

comparison, using an independent and a dependent variable. The independent variable is USAREUR-assigned brigade combat teams. The dependent variable is accomplishment of QDR military strategic goals. The independent variable is operationalized from the secondary research questions. The four values of the independent variable are:

1. Participation of USAREUR assigned BCTs /support units
2. Participation of other EUCOM service components
3. Participation of US Army rotational forces from outside the EUCOM AOR
4. Participation of non-US European land forces

The researcher selected a case study for each value of the independent variable in order to measure the effect on the dependent variable. The operationalization of the dependent variable is based on the QDR's US military strategic goals in Europe. The five values of the dependent variable are shown on the left column of table 1.

Table 1. Operationalization of the Dependent Variable from QDR goals

QDR Military Strategic Goals for Europe	Extracted Dependent Variable Questions
1.Deter the political intimidation of allies and partners.	Did (Independent Variable Value) dissuade a stronger actor from threatening a weaker nation? Q1 :
2.Promote stability in the EUCOM AOR.	Did (Independent Variable Value) prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region? Q2 :
3.Demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies.	Did (Independent Variable Value) allow US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies? Q3 :
4.Build trust and goodwill among host nations.	Did (Independent Variable Value) provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance? Q4 : Did (Independent Variable Value) operation establish trust between US government and other nation's government? Q5 :
5.Facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent.	Did (Independent Variable Value) facilitate bi- or multilateral operations? Q6 : Did (Independent Variable Value) engage in operations that furthered US security interests? Q7 : Was (Independent Variable Value) able to project its forces forward without assistance? Q8 :

Source: Created by author.

Using structured, focused comparison, the researcher developed questions to guide collection and analysis of data for each value of the dependent variable (table 1, right column) in each case. An answer of “yes” to each question was given a value of 1, and an answer of “no” was given a value of 0. The sum of the numerical values for the answers to the questions will be tallied at the end of the analysis, thereby producing an aggregate numerical value for the dependent variable in each case ranging from 0-8. The research methodology thereby incorporates statistical data in a qualitative manner as the means to assess each case study in terms of the effect of each value of the independent variable on whether or not specific QDR objectives were met.

The case studies were selected because they offered a range of values for the dependent variable. They are also arrayed along the conflict continuum; therefore they provide an indication of the effect of the independent variable in conditions of peace or war. Table 2 depicts the entire research design including the case studies, independent, and dependent variables:

Table 2. Overall Research Design

Conflict Continuum	Case Study	Values of the Independent Variable (extracted from secondary research questions)		Values of the Dependent Variable (Extracted from QDR Goals)							
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8		
War	Major Campaigns and Operations	Operation Serval	Participation of non-US European Land Forces	Q1 Y/N	Q2 Y/N	Q3 Y/N	Q4 Y/N	Q5 Y/N	Q6 Y/N	Q7 Y/N	Q8 Y/N
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations	JTF Liberia		Participation of other EUCOM Service Components	Q1 Y/N	Q2 Y/N	Q3 Y/N	Q4 Y/N	Q5 Y/N	Q6 Y/N	Q7 Y/N	Q8 Y/N
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, Deterrence	Operation Joint Endeavor		Participation of USAREUR assigned BCT/Support Units	Q1 Y/N	Q2 Y/N	Q3 Y/N	Q4 Y/N	Q5 Y/N	Q6 Y/N	Q7 Y/N	Q8 Y/N
Peace	Operation Steadfast Jazz		Participation of US Army Rotational Forces from outside EUCOM AOR	Q1 Y/N	Q2 Y/N	Q3 Y/N	Q4 Y/N	Q5 Y/N	Q6 Y/N	Q7 Y/N	Q8 Y/N

Source: Created by author.

The case studies analyze the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The format of each case study includes a brief background of the event followed by an in-depth analysis of whether or not the case meets QDR objectives, based on the questions in table 1. The case studies are arranged as follows to help answer the secondary research questions:

Secondary Question 1: How have US Army units in Europe contributed to the fulfillment of QDR goals?

Bosnia-Herzegovina was selected as a case study because it was the most violent armed conflict in Europe since World War II.¹⁰³ The purpose of Joint Endeavor was to provide peacekeeping forces to supervise the ceasefire that was organized by NATO in the Bosnian civil war. This case study was selected because it involved predominantly USAREUR units, and it was the first out-of-area operation in NATO history.¹⁰⁴

Secondary Question 2: Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR brigade combat teams and support units?

Operation Serval is an operation conducted by French military forces in response to the government of Mali's request for military support in 2013. Operation Serval was selected as a case study for several reasons. First, it highlights a small scale offensive and stability campaign conducted by a European nation. Second, it reveals European force

¹⁰³R. Cody Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995–2004* (Washington DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2010), 1.

¹⁰⁴Harold E. Raugh, Jr., PhD, *Operation Joint Endeavor: V Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995-1996* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, June, 2010), 1.

projection capabilities and shortfalls. Third, this case study was conducted to evaluate what is believed to be the most ready force in Europe, the French armed forces, and analyze whether or not individual European militaries can help meet QDR goals without US land forces present in Europe.

Secondary Research Question 3: Can EUCOM's other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units?

The case selected to answer this secondary research question is the US's 2003 intervention in the second Liberian Civil War. This incident was a EUCOM led response when the African continent was still in the EUCOM AOR. EUCOM did not deploy any USAREUR organic combat and combat support units to Liberia. Although USAREUR contributed personnel, those personnel remained in Europe to stand up the joint task force headquarters. The deployed forces came from the Marines, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations forces.

Secondary Research Question 4: Can the US Army use forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals?

Case Study on Steadfast Jazz (SFJ), which was a NATO joint exercise conducted in November 2013 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It is unique because it was one of the largest NATO exercise in Europe since the end of the Cold War and the largest NATO live-fire exercise since 2006.¹⁰⁵ It is also distinctive because it was the first time

¹⁰⁵ Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe," <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/steadfast-jazz-2013-us-lackluster-contribution-undermines-us-interests-in-eastern-europe> (accessed December 19, 2013).

that the US did not contribute any infantry or armor units to a large NATO exercise. For the purposes of this research, SFJ represents USAREUR's first use of a regionally aligned force instead of assigned brigade combat teams. Therefore, the case study was selected to help answer the secondary research question about whether or not the US Army can use forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals, instead of units that are forward stationed.

Utilizing a comparative case study methodology to analyze these secondary research questions provides several advantages. The primary advantage of using case studies about military operations is that they provide detailed information and a more complete picture of historical events by allowing the researcher to compile data from multiple sources.¹⁰⁶ A comparative case study approach also benefits the reader. This research technique forces the researcher to provide a clear procedure to the reader and allows the reader to check and verify the researcher's gathered information. Additionally, using a comparative case study approach gives the researcher the freedom to determine where the emphasis of the research project lies after the compilation of data is completed.¹⁰⁷

Although a comparative case study strategy benefits the research, there are also some disadvantages to the process. Due to research limitations, only one case study applies to each secondary question. This causes two problems that may lead to inaccurate

¹⁰⁶ Palena Neal Ph.D, Shaym Thapa, Ph.D, and Carolyn Boyce, "A Guide for Designing and Conducting a Case Study for Evaluation Input," *Pathfinder International* (May 2006): 4.

¹⁰⁷ Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2010), 3.

findings. First, a single case study conducted per secondary research question might result in insufficient gathering of data by the researcher. This may distort the picture presented during the analysis. Specifically, a case study might highlight an example but its results might not be generalizable to the entire research question. Additionally, case studies tend to generalize problems from one case to another, and a single case study is insufficient to identify a trend. Furthermore, the cases selected for this research are heterogeneous and include three operational case studies and one exercise case study which makes it more difficult to conduct a structured, focused comparison. With this understanding, the researcher purposely selected heterogeneous case studies in order to evaluate the accomplishment of QDR goals across the conflict continuum from peace to war (as depicted in table 2).

However, it is the researcher's belief that utilizing a case study approach in this particular topic strengthened the research by providing current and relevant information. This researcher does not presume to generalize the results of the case studies over a larger population. Rather than identifying trends, this research aims to identify and further frame the entire problem.

In conclusion, this research utilizes the methodology of a structured, focused comparison of cases in order to answer the secondary research questions. The research design assigns values to the independent variable (the accomplishment of QDR goals) by analyzing different case studies and measuring the effect on the dependent variable. The four case studies include Operation Serval, Operation Joint Endeavor, JTF Liberia, and Steadfast Jazz. Upon completion of the analysis in chapter 4, the researcher will compile

the results of each of these secondary research questions, and thereby aim to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this research is to assess whether or not the US can accomplish its military strategic goals in Europe as outlined in the QDR without USAREUR's assigned brigade combat teams and support units. The secondary research questions help to answer the primary research question and represent the bulk of the analysis contained within Chapter 4. The analysis uses structured, focused comparison of four case studies to address the four secondary research questions. The case studies are broken down into sub-sections that include a background of the case study, an analysis of the correlation between the independent variable (USAREUR assigned brigade combat teams and support units) with the dependent variable (accomplishment of QDR military strategic goals), and a presentation of research findings. Chapter 4 concludes by summarizing the findings and answering the secondary research question using the methodology for operationalization of the variable as described in chapter 3. The secondary research questions are:

1. How do US Army units in Europe contribute to the fulfillment of QDR goals?
2. Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR BCTs and support units?
3. Can EUCOM's other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units?
4. Can the US Army use regionally aligned forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals?

Each secondary research question is addressed in a case study, the first of which is Operation Joint Endeavor.

Secondary Research Question 1: How do US Army units in Europe contribute to the fulfillment of QDR goals?

Bosnia-Herzegovina was selected as a case study because it was the most violent armed conflict in Europe since World War II.¹⁰⁸ The purpose of Joint Endeavor was to provide peacekeeping forces to supervise the ceasefire that was organized by NATO in the Bosnian civil war. This case study was selected because it involved predominantly USAREUR units, and it was the first out-of-area operation in NATO history.¹⁰⁹

Background of Operation Joint Endeavor

The Bosnian conflict was the most violent in a series of four wars that occurred to reallocate territory and ethnic populations among the remains of former Yugoslavia.¹¹⁰ In 1992, conflict engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war was predominantly a territorial conflict, but centered on multiple ethnic groups, including Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats. The Bosnian Serb Army focused its efforts on the eradication of Muslim Bosniaks. A UN protection force was sent to the region to deter conflict and provide humanitarian aid, but the violence continued to escalate.¹¹¹ The UNPROFOR

¹⁰⁸Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role*, 1.

¹⁰⁹Raugh, *Operation Joint Endeavor: V Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1.

¹¹⁰R. Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans, 1991-2002* (Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 325.

¹¹¹United Nations, “Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm (accessed May 8, 2014).

proved insufficient to meet its mandate and war in Bosnia to rage for three years.¹¹² In the end, the peacekeeping force was barely able to defend itself and protect the humanitarian relief coming into the country.¹¹³ Attacks on the UNPROFOR escalated, and after the Bosnian Serb Army committed war crimes, NATO decided to intervene.¹¹⁴ NATO conducted a 12-day air campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, in order to destroy the Bosnian Serb Army.¹¹⁵ Over sixty NATO aircraft from eight countries conducted strikes from 30 August until 20 September 1995.¹¹⁶ The campaign proved successful and the NATO air strikes were suspended to allow the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from the Sarajevo exclusion zone.¹¹⁷ Subsequent negotiations resulted in the Dayton Agreement, which was reached in November 1995.¹¹⁸

Operation Joint Endeavor was a multinational operation conducted by the United States, NATO, and the Russian Federation to enforce the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.¹¹⁹ NATO deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR) and divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into three separate areas

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed May 8, 2014).

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role*, 13.

¹¹⁷NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

of operation and created French, UK, and US sectors (Multinational Divisions-North, South, and West). This case study focuses on the US-led Task Force Eagle located in MND-North.

Analysis

In order to answer the secondary research question, the researcher evaluated the effect of the independent variable (USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation) on the dependent variable using the following questions:

1. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?
2. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?
3. Did the participation of USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units demonstrate the US commitment to NATO allies?
4. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?
5. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?
6. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations?
7. Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?
8. Were the USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units able to project their forces forward without assistance?

Task Force Eagle was formed out of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, and consisted of units from 1st Armored Division (USAREUR), Russia, Turkey, and included a multinational contingent of seven nations that constituted the Nordic brigade.¹²⁰ In addition to the headquarters element, the US provided two armored brigades (1st and 2nd brigades of 1 AD), which made the US contribution over 24,000 soldiers.¹²¹ The mission of Task Force Eagle was to enforce the ceasefire, establish boundaries for the zone of separation between the hostile parties, and ensure that Bosnian Serb forces withdrew.¹²² The intent was to demonstrate overwhelming power and force to discourage any hostile response from Bosnian Serbs or other hostile groups.

The Bosnian Serb Army committed several atrocities against the Muslim Bosniaks during the conflict. Once IFOR and Task Force Eagle began operating, the most extreme violence stopped almost immediately.¹²³ Once IFOR arrived, external actors including Serbia and Croatia no longer emboldened hostilities among the ethnic groups.¹²⁴ The 1 AD staff believed that the task force deployed with sufficient force to annihilate any force arrayed against Task Force Eagle, and this was instrumental in ensuring the full compliance from the factional armies.¹²⁵ Moreover, the opposing forces

¹²⁰Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 19.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹²³Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 40; NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹²⁴Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 325.

¹²⁵Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 19. Account of 1AD staff officer in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

were convinced by the presence of IFOR that implementation of overwhelming combat power was imminent.¹²⁶ However, some elements of infrastructure instability persisted in the country.

The Dayton Peace accords called for free movement and settlement of all ethnic groups, but few people were able to return to their homes. Hostile ethnic groups disrupted the movement between ethnic-dominated enclaves.¹²⁷ Stability forces still remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 2004, European Union peacekeeping troops (EUFOR) replaced SFOR. Currently EUFOR maintains around 600 troops in theater in a policing capacity.¹²⁸ Political and ethnic tensions persist and without international peacekeepers, local violence or conflict caused by ethnic rivalry is still very possible.¹²⁹

Overall, Task Force Eagle increased stability throughout the Balkan region. Task Force Eagle and IFOR's goals were completed in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the September 1996 elections.¹³⁰ Even though some random acts of violence continued, they declined over time starting with the arrival of the task force.¹³¹ Task Force Eagle's

¹²⁶Ibid., 23.

¹²⁷Ibid., 38.

¹²⁸CIA, “The World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (accessed May 8, 2014).

¹²⁹Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 331.

¹³⁰NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹³¹Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 331; Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 38.

deployment began in early December 1995, and by September 1996, U.S. leadership had transformed Bosnia into a country at relative peace.¹³²

The participation of USAREUR assigned BCTs and support units allowed the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies. As part of the NATO RRF, the 1st AD contributed to over one-third of the 60,000 soldiers in IFOR and deployed the majority of armored and mechanized forces into the country.¹³³ Additionally, the US Army enabled the movement of Task Force Eagle into Bosnia-Herzegovina by creating the largest pontoon bridge since World War II.¹³⁴

USAREUR units also provided humanitarian assistance during Operation Joint Endeavor. USAREUR's civil affairs units organized hundreds of reconstruction and relief projects in northeastern Bosnia.¹³⁵ Additionally, several individual USAREUR units engaged in relief activities, by distributing donations.¹³⁶ Task Force Eagle also repaired roads and bridges to enable the free movement of traffic. However some critics claim that Bosnia has new security problems from the conflict that the Task Force Eagle should

¹³²Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” *Foreign Service Journal* (December 1998): 1; NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

¹³³Brigadier General John S. Brown, review of Bosnia-Herzegovina the US Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995-2004, Center for Military History Publication(2010), ii.

¹³⁴“US Army in Europe History,” US Army in Europe, <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/history.htm> (accessed May 8, 2014).

¹³⁵Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 31.

¹³⁶Ibid.

have addressed including corruption, drug and human trafficking, and weak law enforcement.¹³⁷

During Operation Joint Endeavor, USAREUR assigned units engaged in multilateral operations. The multinational effort behind these peace enforcement operations represented NATO's first out-of-area deployment, with USAREUR contributing over a third of the force.¹³⁸ Overall, the USAREUR assigned BCTs and support units participation furthered US security interests. Despite precarious peace accords in Bosnia, Task Force Eagle completed all major objectives outlined by its mission.¹³⁹ The task force enforced the ceasefire, established boundaries for the zone of separation between the hostile parties, ensured that Bosnian Serb forces stayed withdrawn from Bosnia, and prevented civilian casualties.¹⁴⁰ This contributed directly to establishing trust between the task force and Bosniaks.

Table 3, summarizes the results of the analysis of the Operation Joint Endeavor case study.

¹³⁷Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 326.

¹³⁸Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 41.

¹³⁹Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 326.

¹⁴⁰Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 38; Elvin Freeman, "Operation Restore Hope vs. Operation Joint Endeavor,"United States Army Sergeants Major Academy White Paper, March 31, 2008, 3.

Table 3. Operation Joint Endeavor Research Results

Dependent Variables	Answer	Score
1) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?	Yes	1
2) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?	Yes	1
3) Did the participation of USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units demonstrate the US commitment to NATO allies?	Yes	1
4) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?	Yes	1
5) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?	Yes	1
6) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations?	Yes	1
7) Did USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?	Yes	1
8) Were the USAREUR assigned BCTs / support units able to project their forces forward without assistance?	Yes	1
	TOTAL	8

Source: Created by author.

Secondary Research Question 2: Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR BCTs and support units?

The French intervention in Mali in 2012, known as Operation Serval, was selected as a case study for several reasons. First, it highlights a small scale offensive and stability campaign conducted by a European nation. Second, it reveals European force projection capabilities and shortfalls. Third, it showcases what many believe to be one of the most ready military forces in Europe.¹⁴¹ If the US is going to reduce the number of infantry and armor brigades in Europe, then it will rely on its European allies to share more of the

¹⁴¹Entous Adam, “Mali Exposes Flaws in West’s Security Plans,” *Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition*, January 24, 2013. Starting in 2009, European governments cut military spending by approximately 10 percent each year. French military spending has held up far better than other countries in Europe, including Great Britain, declining less than 7 percent in total from 2009 to 2011.

burden of defense. The secondary research question addressed in this portion of the analysis seeks to determine whether or not US allies in Europe can help achieve the QDR goals without US land power present on the continent.

Background of Operation Serval

In early January 2012, Tuareg tribes from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebelled against Mali's central government in order to divide Mali into two separate countries. By April, the MNLA claimed it had accomplished its goals against the Malian government and claimed independence of a separate region of Azawad. Radical Islamist groups, primarily Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), sought to take advantage of the chaos surrounding a failing state and drove the MNLA out of all major cities by December 2012. The Malian government requested military assistance, and by 20 December 2012, the UN passed a Security Council Resolution authorizing French intervention. France launched its Mali offensive known as Operation Serval on January 11, 2013 with four main objectives: block the southward progression from terrorist groups; secure Bamako (which included the protection of Western nationals and ensure the continued existence of Mali institutions); strike terrorist groups rear areas in order to deny them any resupply; and finally, restore the territorial integrity of Mali.¹⁴²

In order to accomplish this, the French deployed 4,500 French troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters from units stationed in Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal, Chad, and France. The French military divided the operation into three phases: seize the initiative,

¹⁴²French Army Major Lenet, “Intervention in Mali: Operation Serval” (Lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 10, 2013).

dominate, and transition control to African Union troops.¹⁴³ Operation Serval began when a special forces aviation unit initiated strikes on an enemy column headed to Bamako. The French Army quickly deployed and combined units based in Africa to form a battlegroup (roughly a battalion sized unit) that secured Bamako. In mid-February, a brigade-sized French force assaulted Timbuktu and Gao using ground movements, air assaults, and airborne operations.¹⁴⁴ By May 2013, the French had withdrawn the majority of their combat forces, allowing an African Union-led force to take the lead.

Analysis

Operation Serval provides the platform to examine the independent variable, European land forces, and measure the outcome of the following dependent variables:

1. Did European land forces participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?
2. Did European land forces participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?
3. Did European land forces participation allow the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies?
4. Did European land forces participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?
5. Did European land forces participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Olivier Tramond and Philipe Seigneur, "Early Lessons from France's Operation Serval in Mali," *Army* 63, no. 6 (June, 2013): 42.

6. Did European land forces participation engage in bi- or multilateral operations?
7. Did European land forces participation further US security interests?
8. Were European forces able to project their forces forward without assistance?

In order to answer the secondary research question and the questions extracted from the dependent variable, the author analyzed Operation Serval in two parts. The first section of the analysis examines the French ability to project its forces forward. The second portion of the analysis studies the French military's execution of the warfighting functions in order to determine where the French required US support and what type of support was needed.

Force projection consists of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and employment of forces.¹⁴⁵ The French mobilization largely consisted of two efforts: reposition forces already located in Africa and mobilize forces located in France. Several months prior to their deployment to Mali, French land forces developed a contingency deployment plan titled Guépard (Cheetah). The plan utilized a French mechanized brigade backed by an airborne emergency element, both based in France. This highly ready force proved essential at maintaining the initiative against terrorist forces in Mali.¹⁴⁶ The remaining troops were already mobilized and stationed in bases in countries

¹⁴⁵Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection includes the processes of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces, Joint Pub 3-0.

¹⁴⁶Tramond and Philippe, "Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali," 43.

around Mali. The French mobilization for Operation Serval was quick and effective, and French leadership saw it as a key reason for operational success.¹⁴⁷

The French deployment consisted of two major troop movements of units already in Africa, and the deployment of rapid reaction forces located in France. The vast majority of the initial forces deployed to Mali came from French bases in Africa, including Cote di Ivory, Chad, Senegal and Burkina Faso. While the mobilization of French troops proved fast and effective, the deployment of forces would not run as smoothly.

The French deployment to Mail would not have been possible without the support of key allies. The French possess only a small airlift capability due to a limited number of airlift platforms. Therefore, the French military required significant airlift support from its allies and outside contractors to deploy approximately 4,500 French troops including light vehicles, medium armor, and helicopters. Without external support, the French were able to fly approximately 2,000 troops from France to Africa.¹⁴⁸ However, in order to supplement France's limited supply of transport aircraft, the French government rented cargo planes from companies in Russia and Ukraine.¹⁴⁹ French allies including Canada, Great Britain, and the United States assisted in deployment efforts. In one month's time,

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Entous Adam, “Mali Exposes Flaws in West's Security Plans,” 2.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

the USAF alone flew 190 sorties, transporting 1,480 French troops, and 2,400 tons of cargo and equipment into Mali.¹⁵⁰

After the initial deployment efforts concluded, the French military began jointly operating with Malian forces, pushing east in Mali to drive out the radical Islamist forces. The French mission command organization largely mirrored that for a US joint task force or a NATO task force, which facilitated bilateral operations with the Malian Army.¹⁵¹ The organization included land, air, maritime, special operations components, and a Malian Army contingent.¹⁵² This system worked well for the French and was lauded as an operational strength by both French generals and subsequent Armée De Terre after action reviews.¹⁵³ The joint headquarters was forward deployed to Sierra Leon facilitated joint operations down to even the battalion and company levels.¹⁵⁴

French generals believed that the French military's capacity to adapt to joint understanding and mastery of fire control during the operation aided in its success.¹⁵⁵ French utilized and validated new fire support equipment, specifically the 155 CAESAR

¹⁵⁰Gabe Starosta, “Mission to Mali,” *Air Force Magazine* 96, no. 11 (November 2013): 48.

¹⁵¹LtCol Yannick Legrand and LtCol Emmanuel Durville, “French Update September-October 2013,” *Armée de Terre Special Update* (October 2013): 1.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

self-propelled howitzer and the TIGRE attack helicopter.¹⁵⁶ However, French reliance on firepower highlighted some issues. First, French close air support (CAS) platforms did not have sufficient overhead station time because of limited French aerial tankers. France called on its NATO allies, and the USAF established a refueling bridge of KC-135 tankers between Europe and Africa. The USAF off-loaded more than 14 million pounds of fuel, ensuring that French close air support was able to reach the French front lines in Mali.¹⁵⁷ Second, targeting proved to be a severe limitation in French fire support capabilities. Admiral Guillaud identified some French military capability gaps where US information surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR) provided much of the targeting information to French howitzers and aircraft.¹⁵⁸

The Armée De Terre also proved adept at maneuvering against the enemy, and quickly seized Bamako within the first month of mission notification.¹⁵⁹ One of the main reasons for success included the preparedness and operational readiness of the French reaction forces, which ensured combat power was available in Mali within three weeks.¹⁶⁰ The second main reason that General Barrera attributed to French success was the element of surprise.¹⁶¹ However, the French Army did have some tactical setbacks

¹⁵⁶Legrand and Durville, “French Update September-October 2013.”

¹⁵⁷Starosta, “Mission to Mali,” 50.

¹⁵⁸Nadia Deseilligny, “France Mulls Mali Campaign Lessons,” *Jane's Defence Weekly* (December 9, 2013): 1.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

during the advance east when battling AQIM forces. These setbacks occurred because of limited on station time for CAS platforms.¹⁶² However, once the issues with close air support were solved, they were able to quickly seize objectives and maintain the initiative against AQIM.¹⁶³

The performance of French intelligence during Operation Serval had some strong points, but proved to be lacking as a whole. French after action reviews indicated that the full involvement of Malian and other African troops legitimized French efforts, which encourage wider acceptance by the locals and led to increase in human intelligence.¹⁶⁴ This greatly benefited many of the tactical level missions that occurred during Serval and tied into the French knowledge of the human dimension during the operation. The Armée De Terre' ability to understand its cultural environment greatly contributed to mission success.¹⁶⁵

However, at the operational and strategic level, the French military revealed that it still had some serious limitations providing sufficient enabler support such as ISR, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and other intelligence capabilities.¹⁶⁶ These gaps were filled by primarily by US forces. USAF and Army ISR and intelligence provided the targeting information for the initial airstrikes prior to French assaults on enemy defensive

¹⁶²Deseilligny, “France Mulls Mali Campaign Lessons.”

¹⁶³Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

¹⁶⁴Legrand and Durville, “French Update September-October 2013.”

¹⁶⁵Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

¹⁶⁶Legrand and Durville, “French Update September-October 2013.”

positions throughout the campaign.¹⁶⁷ USAREUR also provided limited enabler support primarily with communications arrays, additional human intelligence (HUMINT), and airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT).¹⁶⁸

Limitations in French intelligence were not the only challenges that the Armée De Terre faced in Serval. French sustainment efforts, particularly logistics, provided mixed results during the campaign. One of the major strengths of the French strategy that facilitated logistics was the number of French bases in Africa.¹⁶⁹ However, ground based lines of communication in Africa and Mali are not capable of quickly moving logistics throughout the continent, so French logisticians struggled to keep up with resupply demands from the front in Mali.¹⁷⁰

Therefore, the Armée De Terre had to rely on USAF intra-theater airlift for sustainment assistance, which included a fleet of C-130 airlifters assigned to the region.¹⁷¹ The USAF also set up major airfield procedures and conducted intra-theater airlift, moving people and equipment within Mali.¹⁷² During the campaign, USAF aircraft

¹⁶⁷Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Legrand and Durville, “Armée de Terre Update September-October 2013”; Gerald Hainzl, “Mali After Operation Serval,” *IFK Monitor International* (August 2013): 2.

¹⁷⁰Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43. Identified as a vital by Serval Brigade Commander General Barrera.

¹⁷¹Starosta, “Mission to Mali,” 49.

¹⁷²Ibid.

transported more than 121 tons of cargo within the theater.¹⁷³ Moreover, the French military possessed insufficient number of heavy lift helicopters to facilitate cargo movement.¹⁷⁴

Despite some of these shortcomings, France achieved each of the four operational objectives. First, the French secured Bamako within the first 10 days of the operation and began pushing northeast from there.¹⁷⁵ They successfully blocked Southward progression of terrorist groups and conducted airstrikes in terrorist rear areas, denying resupply and disrupting enemy command and control. Finally, territorial integrity was restored in Mali. By June 18, 2013 the government of Mali and the MNLA declared a ceasefire in order to hold presidential elections¹⁷⁶ In July, the Malian presidential elections were successfully and peacefully held.¹⁷⁷ The French maintain 1600 military personnel in Mali but transitioned authority to a UN stability force. However, more time might be required in order to evaluate the full result of Operation Serval. The infrastructure in Mali is nascent, and Islamist activities continue with occasional attacks from IEDs still occurs.¹⁷⁸

The results of the analysis of the Operation Serval case study are listed in table 4.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Legrand and Durville, “French Update September-October 2013.”

¹⁷⁵Tramond and Philippe, “Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval In Mali,” 43.

¹⁷⁶Hainzl, “Mali After Operation Serval,” 2.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

Table 4. Table Depicting Operation Serval Research Results

Dependent Variables	Answer	Score
1) Did European land forces participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?	Yes	1
2) Did European land forces participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?	Yes	1
3) Did European land forces participation allow the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies?	Yes	1
4) Did European land forces participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?	Yes	1
5) Did European land forces participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?	No	0
6) Did European land forces participation engage in bi- or multilateral operations?	Yes	1
7) Did European land forces participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?	Yes	1
8) Were European land forces able to project their forces forward without assistance?	No	0
	TOTAL	6

Source: Created by author.

Secondary Research Question 3: Can EUCOM's other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units?

The case selected to answer this secondary research question is the US's 2003 intervention in the 2nd Liberian Civil War. There are several reasons for this selection. First, this incident was a EUCOM led response when the African continent was still in the EUCOM AOR. Second, EUCOM did not deploy any USAREUR organic combat and combat support units to Liberia. Although USAREUR contributed personnel, those personnel remained in Europe to stand up the joint task force headquarters. Third, the deployed forces came from the Marines, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations components.

Background of Joint Task Force Liberia

In July of 2003, Liberia was heavily engaged in a 23-year long civil war. The government of President Charles Taylor was desperately defending the capital of Monrovia on two different fronts from two Liberian rebel groups.¹⁷⁹ Bands of rebel and government forces often engaged and robbed civilians, killing over a thousand people in one month.¹⁸⁰ Because of the violence, thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) fled the Liberian capital. Severe food and water shortages combined with an influx of IDPs created a requirement for international humanitarian assistance. However, the dangerous security situation prevented assistance groups from freely moving about the country and providing aid.¹⁸¹

The US had two major interests with regards to Liberia. The United States wanted to prevent the conflict from spreading beyond Liberia and disrupting the region and also to assuage the human suffering present in the county. At the time, the US was conducting missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it was critical that the US not be drawn into a

¹⁷⁹George Kieh, “The Roots of the Second Liberian Civil War,” *International Journal on World Peace* 26, no. 1 (March, 2009): 15. “The horrendous performance of the Taylor regime as reflected in the confluence of three major interrelated factors - ethnic scape -goating, political repression and socio-economic malaise-provided the overarching proximate cause of the country's second civil war.”

¹⁸⁰LTC Thomas Collins, “Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia,” *Army Magazine* (February 1, 2004): 1. LTC Collins was the JTF Liberia Public Affairs Officer; Blair Ross, Jr., “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May/June, 2005): 66. COL Ross was director of the Joint Staff, Joint Task Force Liberia.

¹⁸¹Robert Lloyd, “Rebuilding the Liberian State,” *Current History* 105, no. 691 (May 2006): 229-33.

protracted stability operation.¹⁸² In March of 2003, EUCOM realized that the situation in Liberia was becoming critical and deployed special operations forces and elements of the 398th Air Expeditionary squadron from Europe to Africa in order to assess the situation.¹⁸³

In June, John Blaney, the US Ambassador to Liberia, requested military assistance in the event that embassy personnel and American citizens had to be evacuated from the country.¹⁸⁴ In July, EUCOM directed the formation of a joint task force in order to address the worsening security situation and Joint Task Force Liberia was established. The JTF consisted of a command post contingent led by the US Army, the 26th MEU (a force of 2,200 Marines and 24 aircraft along with combat and support vehicles), the 398th Air Expeditionary Group (provided noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, and forward command and control), the Iwo Jima Readiness Group (naval vessels that contained the embarked MEU), and finally teams from the 1st BN 10th Special Forces Group (a unit under the command of SOCEUR).¹⁸⁵ Outside of acting as the headquarters of the JTF, USAREUR units had no participation. Most US Army units in Europe were either deployed to or preparing to for upcoming deployments to Iraq.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸²Ibid., The United States was focused in Iraq and Afghanistan, still had memories of the debacle in Somalia in 1993, and there were no strong national security interests in Liberia.

¹⁸³Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/liberia_orbat.htm (accessed March 20, 2014).

¹⁸⁴Collins, “Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia.”

¹⁸⁵Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle”; Collins, “Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia,” verified by reports from COL Ross and LTC Collins.

¹⁸⁶Lloyd, “Rebuilding the Liberian State,” 229-233.

The major objectives of the operation included the ousting of President Taylor, stabilizing Monrovia's infrastructure in order to permit the humanitarian assistance organizations to operate in the country, and transition to a UN-led peacekeeping force.¹⁸⁷ To accomplish this, the JTF planned the Liberia operation in four major phases. Phase I assessed and prepared the environment using Special Forces teams assigned to train and advise African military units from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).¹⁸⁸ During Phase II (Containment and Stabilization), the JTF deployed the 26th MEU and the Iwo Jima Readiness Group to the coast of Liberia. During this phase, US forces supported the deployment of two ECOWAS battalion-sized units (known as ECOMIL) into Monrovia. Phase III (Build Up to Mature Multinational Interim Force) focused on deploying and sustaining the remaining ECOMIL forces and conducting operations to secure Liberia for the humanitarian assistance organizations. During Phase IV (Transition and Redeployment), there were two major objectives: transition from ECOMIL to UN force control and redeploy the JTF.

Analysis

The analysis portion of this case study seeks to determine how well the JTF met two QDR goals without USAREUR combat and combat support units. This is accomplished by evaluating the accomplishment of the dependent variables (QDR goals):

1. Did other EUCOM service components participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?

¹⁸⁷Ibid., President Bush demanded that President Taylor to step down-but it was not willing to provide physical security.

¹⁸⁸Ross, "The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia."

2. Did other EUCOM service components participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?
3. Did other EUCOM service components participation allow the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies?
4. Did other EUCOM service components participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?
5. Did other EUCOM service components participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?
6. Did other EUCOM service components participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations?
7. Did other EUCOM service components participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?
8. Was other EUCOM service components participation able to project its forces forward without assistance from USAREUR units?

The JTF entered Liberia beginning with the insertion of Special Forces advisors paired with ECOMIL units. The JTF projected its forces forward without USAREUR assistance, relying on the Iwo Jima Readiness Group and the 398th Air Expeditionary Squadron.¹⁸⁹ By July 29th, the 398th Air Expeditionary Squadron began operating out of Sierra Leon and the Iwo Jima Readiness Group arrived off of the shores of Liberia. On August 5th, the JTF transported 250 ECOMIL soldiers to the Roberts International Airport in Monrovia.

¹⁸⁹Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle.”

President Bush required that the JTF not take the lead in Liberia. Because of this, the JTF commander determined that the center of gravity for the operation would be the ECOMIL forces and postured his JTF to support them.¹⁹⁰ JTF Liberia deployed the ECOMIL forces from Nigeria to the Roberts International Airport (RIA) in two large movements.¹⁹¹ The 398th Squadron transported a total 1,470 ECOMIL soldiers from Nigeria to RIA, 770 in the first movement, and the remainder in the second.¹⁹²

The JTF also provided a forward headquarters element on the Iwo Jima in order to conduct mission command of the JTF and provide support for ECOMIL.¹⁹³ The JTF determined where ECOMIL forces needed support by embedding advisors and conducting meetings between the JTF and ECOMIL commanders. From these two sources of information, the JTF commander determined the ECOMIL forces had no intelligence capabilities outside of human intelligence (HUMINT). Therefore, the JTF provided ECOMIL forces ISR, SIGINT, and HUMINT military intelligence capabilities. Specifically, the JTF conducted reconnaissance by flying aerial presence patrols over Liberia, provided additional intelligence assets including HUMINT, and utilized other Navy and Air Force ISR platforms.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” 66.

¹⁹¹Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle.”

¹⁹²Ibid.

¹⁹³Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” 66.

¹⁹⁴AFN, “Armed Forces Europe News Update July 29, 2003,” <http://www.afneurope.net/default.aspx> (accessed May 19, 2014).

In addition to augmenting the limited intelligence capabilities of ECOMIL, the JTF assisted ECOMIL with logistics. The ECOWAS logistical support of its forces were severely lacking at the beginning of the operation.¹⁹⁵ The JTF identified specific logistics problems by providing a team of seven Marines to support Nigerian peacekeepers.¹⁹⁶ In order to fill the gaps, the JTF sustained ECOMIL through contracts rather than through USAREUR's 21st TSC or JTF sustainment units.¹⁹⁷ Embedded advisors facilitated the contracting process, which helped ECOMIL to successfully conduct stability operations.¹⁹⁸

The other shortfall identified was the ECOMIL's limited ability to provide force protection to their units. The two sources of protection that the JTF delivered to the ECOMIL forces included the Marine quick reaction force (QRF) that operated out of RIA and the JTF's close air support assets.¹⁹⁹ This proved essential to ECOMIL forces because the QRF was highly visible to potential adversaries and without the protection of the QRF assets, RIA might have fallen to hostile forces.²⁰⁰

Once their major warfighting function shortfalls were addressed, ECOMIL forces moved to and maintained a position of relative advantage over both Liberian government

¹⁹⁵Ross, "The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia," 66.

¹⁹⁶Global Security, "US Forces Order of Battle."

¹⁹⁷Collins, "Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia."

¹⁹⁸Frank N. Schubert, *Other Than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 34.

¹⁹⁹Ross, "The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia," 66.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

forces and the warring factions. The JTF's embedded advisors maneuvered with ECOMIL forces from RIA in order to seize Freeport. A quick reaction force of 150 Marines from JTF Liberia went ashore at RIA in Monrovia to free the ECOMIL soldiers to secure the port at Freeport. By August 15th, the UN humanitarian assistance ship Martin I docked at Freeport and began providing humanitarian relief for the thousands of refugees.²⁰¹ The movement of the QRF to RIA and the presence of the JTF dissuaded the hostile forces from threatening one another. Naval and Marine presence off of the coast was a significant deterrent to the militias and government forces throughout the operation.²⁰²

JTF Liberia's operation furthered US security interests and promoted stability in the EUCOM AOR. By August 11, Liberia's president resigned, and President Bush's initial objective was met. ECOMIL units conducted stability operations until October 1, when JTF Liberia announced that the mission was accomplished and transferred responsibility to UN peacekeeping forces. During the JTF deployment, Liberia's government was ousted, a peace agreement was implemented, and forces of the warring factions were dispersed. African forces took the lead, and ECOMIL was capable of securing the RIA and Freeport, and allowing freedom of movement for UN and other humanitarian organizations to deliver relief.²⁰³ However, some members of the UN and

²⁰¹Collins, "Joint Efforts Prevent Humanitarian Disaster in Liberia."

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³Ibid.

humanitarian groups complained that the QRF was removed too quickly and the JTF departed Liberia prematurely.²⁰⁴

The warring parties signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement on August 18, 2003. The peace agreement signaled the political end of the conflict and began the country's transition to democracy until the general election in 2005.²⁰⁵ The 2005 election proved successful and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa.²⁰⁶ Although the peace agreement ended the civil war and the conflict in Monrovia, skirmishes still occurred throughout the countryside.²⁰⁷ Despite the departure of the JTF, US Air Force assets conducted aerial presence patrols over Monrovia and the outlying areas until September of 2003 in order to assure the Liberian people that the war was over and to enforce the cease-fire.²⁰⁸ Liberia, although far from being a safe country is more stable now than it was during the Liberian civil war.²⁰⁹

Overall, the JTF promoted stability in the EUCOM AOR by preventing the Liberian civil war from boiling over and further de-stabilizing the region. By allowing

²⁰⁴Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” 66.

²⁰⁵Crisis Group, “Liberia: Security Challenges,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/liberia/071-liberia-security-challenges.aspx> (accessed April 12, 2014).

²⁰⁶The Nobel Foundation, “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2011,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2011/press.html (accessed April 12, 2014). President Sirleaf along with two other women won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women.

²⁰⁷Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” 66.

²⁰⁸Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” 66.

²⁰⁹Crisis Group, “Liberia: Security Challenges.”

ECOMIL forces to take the lead in the operation, JTF increased the legitimacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military wing, ECOMIL. ECOMIL and the JTF ensured the flow of humanitarian relief, prevented the additional slaughter of civilians, and transferred control the UN Stability force using a minimal US footprint and no USAREUR units.

The results of the analysis of the JTF Liberia case study are presented in table 5.

Table 5. JTF Liberia Research Results

Dependent Variables	Answer	Score
1) Did other EUCOM service components participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?	Yes	1
2) Did EUCOM service components participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?	Yes	1
3) Did the participation of EUCOM service components allow the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies?	No	0
4) Did EUCOM service components participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?	Yes	1
5) Did EUCOM service components participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?	Yes	1
6) Did EUCOM service components participation engage in bi- or multilateral operations?	Yes	1
7) Did EUCOM service components participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?	Yes	1
8) Were EUCOM service components able to project their forces forward without assistance from USAREUR units?	Yes	1
	TOTAL	7

Source: Created by author.

Secondary Research Question 4: Can the US Army use regionally aligned forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals?

Steadfast Jazz (SFJ) was a NATO joint exercise conducted in November of 2013 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It is unique because it is one of the largest NATO exercise in Europe since the end of the cold war and the largest NATO live-fire

exercise since 2006.²¹⁰ It is also distinctive because it is the first time that the US did not contribute any armored units to a large NATO exercise. For the purposes of this research, SFJ represents USAREUR's first use of a regionally aligned force to participate in a training exercise instead of its organic brigade combat teams. Therefore, the case study was selected to help answer the secondary research question that seeks to answer whether or not the US Army can use forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals, instead of units that are forward stationed.

Background of Exercise Steadfast Jazz.

NATO conducted SFJ 13 as the culmination of a series of 18 exercises across 14 different countries. The exercise included forces from 28 NATO member nations and 3 partner nations (Sweden, Finland, Ukraine).²¹¹ There were several reasons to conduct SFJ. First, the purpose of SFJ was train and test the NATO Response Force (NRF).²¹² Second, SFJ was an attempt to reassure the Baltic members of NATO that the alliance

²¹⁰Coffey and Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe."

²¹¹NATO, "Exercise Steadfast Jazz Factsheet: Scope, Aim, Components, Conduct, Locations" http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131031_131031-SFJZ13-Factsheet.pdf (accessed May 1, 2014); NATO Allied Command Operations, "Jazz Ends on A High Note," <http://www.sj13.nato.int/jazz-ends-on-a-high-note.aspx> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²¹²NATO, "Steadfast Jazz Factsheet."

was ready to protect them.²¹³ Third, the operation was conducted to help NATO find new purpose following the completion of combat operations in Afghanistan.²¹⁴

SFJ was designed as a military scenario involving an unidentified foreign force invading Estonia over territorial disputes. The primary focus of SFJ was to validate the NRF. Exercise Steadfast Jazz was designed to test maneuver forces by conducting live fire exercises and the command and control of NRF troops using a fictional scenario.²¹⁵ NATO's land, air, maritime, and special operations component commands participated in the command post exercises, which were located all throughout Europe. The live fire exercises were conducted in Poland (see figure 3).

²¹³Adrian Croft, “NATO Plans Bigger Exercises as It Winds Down Afghan Mission,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-nato-exercise-idUSBRE9A619X20131107> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²¹⁴Croft, “NATO Plans Bigger Exercises as It Winds Down Afghan Mission”; Coffey and Kochis, “Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe.”

²¹⁵NATO, “Steadfast Jazz Factsheet.”



Figure 3. SFZ Exercise Locations Map

Source: USAREUR, “Exercise Steadfast Jazz Map,” <http://www.eur.army.mil/SteadfastJazz/files/Map-SteadfastJazzLocations.jpg> (accessed April 30, 2014).

The number of nations that participated in SFJ helped make the exercise the one of largest exercises that NATO had conducted since the end of the cold war. The event involved about 6,000 military personnel, 350 vehicles, 11 surface vessels, 46 fighter aircraft and 11 helicopters.²¹⁶ Around 3,000 of the troops in the exercise participated in a live exercise while 3,000 headquarters personnel conducted a command and control

²¹⁶NATO, “Steadfast Jazz Factsheet.”

exercise.²¹⁷ Air, land, maritime and special forces components all participated, as well as the headquarters staff from Joint Force Command Brunssum. JFC Brunssum is now certified to lead any NATO joint operations in 2014.²¹⁸ The majority of the forces used in the exercise came from France, who sent 1,200 troops and Poland, who sent 1,040 troops.²¹⁹

Analysis

This analysis seeks to answer whether or not the US Army can rotate forces from the United States to achieve QDR goals. The case study will be evaluated according to the dependent variables extracted from the QDR objectives:

1. Did US Army rotational forces participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?
2. Did US Army rotational forces participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?
3. Did the participation of US Army rotational forces allow the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies?
4. Did US Army rotational forces participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?

²¹⁷NATO, “Steadfast Jazz Factsheet.”

²¹⁸Ibid.

²¹⁹Judy Dempsey, “What NATO’s Steadfast Jazz Exercises Mean for Europe,” *Carnegie Europe* (October 31, 2013): 1, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53467> (accessed April 30, 2014).

5. Did US Army rotational forces participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?

6. Did US Army rotational forces participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations?

7. Did US Army rotational forces participation further US security interests?

8. Were the US Army rotational forces able to project their forces forward without assistance from USAREUR units?

USAREUR contributed to SFJ in several ways. First, USAREUR provided 250 soldiers from USAREUR to participate in the exercise.²²⁰ Specifically, USAREUR deployed observer controllers from the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command to provide expertise and evaluation on tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting multilateral missions.²²¹ Second, USAREUR provided a small contingent of 173rd IBCT (airborne) soldiers to participate in the exercise. Finally, USAREUR deployed sixty soldiers from the US-based regionally aligned force, the 1st Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division (1/1 CAV), consisting of mostly brigade level staff officers.²²²

²²⁰U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs, “USAREUR to Participate in Steadfast Jazz 2013,” http://www.army.mil/article/113882/USAREUR_to_participate_in_Steadfast_Jazz_2013/ (accessed April 30, 2014).

²²¹A. M. LaVey, “Seventh Army OCs Bring Doctrinal Knowledge to the Field,” http://www.eur.army.mil/news/2013/20131108_7thArmyOCs.html (accessed April 30, 2014).

²²²Angel Jackson, “Ironhorse Brigade Participates in Steadfast Jazz 2013,” <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/116206/ironhorse-brigade-participates-steadfast-jazz-2013#.U3ptoF4tor0> (accessed April 30, 2014).

USAREUR's first objective of participating in SFJ was to demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, which directly aligns with a QDR objective.²²³ Article V states NATO members will always assist each other in the event of an attack against a NATO member.²²⁴ Following the deactivation of USAREUR's two brigade combat teams (170th and 172nd IBCTs), the US Secretary of Defense committed a regionally aligned armored brigade to support the NRF.²²⁵ 1st Brigade Combat Team from 1st Cavalry Division was designated as both EUCOM regionally aligned force and the US commitment to the NATO response force in 2013.²²⁶

A regionally aligned force is a unit assigned to or allocated to combatant commands, and prepared by the Army for regional missions.²²⁷ USAREUR's regionally aligned force is 1/1CAV. During SFJ, 1/1 CAV sent 60 soldiers to conduct mission command exercises and to liaise with NATO allies. The RAF concept provides several benefits that affected SFJ. First, it enhanced trust and understanding by establishing relationships between the RAF and European counterparts.²²⁸ Second, this regionally

²²³ USAREUR PAO, "USAREUR to Participate in Steadfast Jazz," "Steadfast Jazz 2013 is [how] we demonstrate our strong national commitment to NATO." LTG Campbell.

²²⁴ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*.

²²⁵ USAREUR, "European Rotational Force / NATO Response Force Factsheet," http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/factsheets/FactSheet_RAF.pdf (accessed April 30, 2014).

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* 43, no. 3 (Autumn, 2013): 55-63.

²²⁸ Ibid.

aligned deployment provided a cultural experience for the NATO soldiers and 1/1 CAV.²²⁹

Although a deploying an element of EUCOM's RAF represents an effort to meet US commitments, it was far less than NATO exercises in previous years.²³⁰ The 1/1 CAV Brigade Headquarters participated in the command and control exercise, however the battalion sized armored task force did not deploy to participate in SFJ.²³¹ Some NATO allies complained that the US did not commit sufficient numbers of soldiers and they did not participate in the live fire exercise due to a lack of armored equipment.²³² The 1 CAV regionally aligned force is designed to rotate a BN sized task force and a brigade headquarters to the EUCOM AOR twice per year.²³³ However, this did not occur. Part of the reason was that USAREUR redeployed all armored equipment including tanks with the deactivation of the 170th and 172nd BCTs in 2012.²³⁴ This meant that no armored vehicles were available to train with during 2013.

However, the Army recognizes these issues and plans to remedy them in the early stages of 2014. First, USAREUR plans to rotate a battalion-sized force to Germany to

²²⁹Ibid.

²³⁰Coffey and Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe."

²³¹Michael S. Darnell, "American Tanks Return to Europe After Brief Leave," *Stars and Stripes*, January 31, 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/american-tanks-return-to-europe-after-brief-leave-1.264910> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²³²Dempsey, "What NATO's Steadfast Jazz Exercises Mean for Europe."

²³³USAREUR, "European Rotational Force / Nato Response Force Factsheet."

²³⁴Darnell, "American Tanks Return to Europe After Brief Leave."

participate in training exercises starting in 2014.²³⁵ Additionally, USAREUR has recently taken control of a combined arms battalion worth of equipment that has been sent back to Germany to serve as the European Activity Set located at JMTTC.²³⁶

Although the US Army's participation in SFJ was limited, especially compared to French participation, the lessons learned resulted in an increased commitment to NATO allies. The Regionally Aligned Force construct is still relatively nascent and requires some fine-tuning.

Did the RAF participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations? Facilitate in military terms is defined as helping the forward progress of forces in the forms of sustainment, key enablers like signal and intelligence assets, and combat forces like brigade combat teams. The 60 soldiers brought from the rotational RAF to liaise and advise facilitated the execution of exercise, but to a much smaller extent than the French and the Polish militaries did.²³⁷ As previously addressed, armored forces that participate in live fire exercise might have achieved better results.²³⁸ Moreover, the presence of enablers such as ISR and UAV systems may have provided greater assistance NATO allies.²³⁹

²³⁵USAREUR, "European Rotational Force / NATO Response Force Factsheet."

²³⁶Darnell, "American Tanks Return to Europe After Brief Leave."

²³⁷LaVey, "Seventh Army OCs Bring Doctrinal Knowledge to the Field."

²³⁸Coffey and Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe."

²³⁹Ibid.

USAREUR sent two of its own organic units, an engineer company from the 173rd and observer controllers from JMTC to participate in SFJ. The engineer company participated with the exercise providing assistance during multinational training including route clearing and construction of fighting positions.²⁴⁰ JMTC brought one observer controller team from the engineer training section primarily to train and advise the 173rd engineer units, but also to provide assistance during multinational training.²⁴¹

Overall, it's difficult to assess whether or not rotational forces facilitated the SFJ multilateral operation. Armored forces were not present to participate in live fire exercises, nor was there any enabler support provided by the RAF. The 1/1 CAV staff was the only force from provided by the RAF. The support units that did participate in SFZ, was an engineer unit from the 173rd and an observer controller team from JMTC, both organic USAREUR units.

Did US Army rotational forces' participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor? One of the primary reasons to conduct SFJ was to assuage NATO's Eastern members of the alliance's commitment to mutual defense.²⁴² Several of the former Warsaw Pact nations expressed concern with some of the Russian exercises that occurred near western borders.²⁴³ In particular, Russia conducted two large multinational exercises with Belarus known as Operation Zapad

²⁴⁰LaVey, "Seventh Army OCs Bring Doctrinal Knowledge to the Field."

²⁴¹Ibid.

²⁴²Coffey and Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe."

²⁴³Croft, "NATO Plans Bigger Exercises as It Winds Down Afghan Mission."

2009 and Zapad 2013.²⁴⁴ In 2009, Operation Zapad simulated a nuclear strike on Warsaw, while Zapad 2013 postured 10,000 Russian troops in the western military district of Russia.²⁴⁵ The exercises gave Poland and the Baltic States reason to question Russia's intentions along their borders. Because of this, NATO members Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia requested a NATO military exercise in Poland in order to help deter any potential adversaries.²⁴⁶

Poland and the Baltic States were intimidated by Russian exercises on the border and several still feel that Russia poses a conventional threat.²⁴⁷ Most NATO nations believe that the Russian threat is low, but concede that there was little doubt that Russia, through several large exercises, is preparing its military for conflicts with well-armed nations.²⁴⁸ Based on the results of SFJ, it's difficult to determine how USAREUR's regionally aligned force contributed to deterrence of political intimidation.

Did the participation of the RAF further US security interests? The primary focus of SFJ was to validate the NRF. The NRF is designed to be a ready multinational force

²⁴⁴ Coffey and Kochis, "Steadfast Jazz 2013: U.S. Lackluster Contribution Undermines U.S. Interests in Eastern Europe."

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ NATO, "Steadfast Jazz Factsheet".

²⁴⁷ Andrew Rettman, "NATO War Games On Russian Border Come at Tricky Time in EU-Russia Relations," *EU Observer*, October 15, 2013, <http://euobserver.com/defence/121791> (accessed April 30, 2014); Croft, "NATO Plans Bigger Exercises as It Winds Down Afghan Mission"; Peter Apps, "Russia's Big Rise in Military Spending, Training Has Allies Worried," *Bangor Daily News*, November 1, 2013, <http://bangordailynews.com/2013/11/01/news/world-news/russias-big-rise-in-military-spending-has-allies-worried/> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²⁴⁸ Apps, "Russia's Big Rise in Military Spending."

that is made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.²⁴⁹ The NRF trains to respond to full-spectrum of military missions, including high-intensity combat operations.²⁵⁰ Exercise Steadfast Jazz successfully tested maneuver forces by conducting live fire exercises and NATO command and control elements because of the exercise.²⁵¹

The results of the analysis of the Steadfast Jazz case study are shown in table 6.

Table 6. Exercise Steadfast Jazz Research Results

Dependent Variables	Answer	Score
1) Did US Army rotational forces participation dissuade a stronger actor from threatening or unduly influencing a weaker actor?	No	0
2) Did US Army rotational forces participation prevent instability from spreading or contribute to stability in the country or region?	No	0
3) Did the participation of US Army rotational forces demonstrate the US commitment to NATO allies?	Yes	1
4) Did US Army rotational forces participation provide or enable other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance?	No	0
5) Did US Army rotational forces participation establish trust between US government and other nation's government?	Yes	1
6) Did US Army rotational forces participation facilitate bi- or multilateral operations?	Yes	1
7) Did US Army rotational forces participation engage in operations that furthered US security interests?	Yes	1
8) Were the US Army rotational forces able to project their forces forward without assistance?	No	0
	TOTAL	4

Source: Created by author.

²⁴⁹NATO, “Steadfast Jazz Factsheet”.

²⁵⁰Ibid.

²⁵¹Ibid.

Research Findings

In order to draw some initial conclusions about how the participation of the different military forces allowed the US to meet the QDR's defense strategic goals for Europe, the researcher tallied up the values of the dependent variable for each case study and compared the results (see Table 3 below). The research points to an initial conclusion that USAREUR assigned BCTs and support units still provide the best ability to meet QDR goals, as demonstrated by the Army's performance in Operation Joint Endeavor. Although EUCOM's organic units, US Army rotational forces, and US European allies may not meet every QDR goal without US Army support, they can achieve several QDR goals without US Army brigade combat teams permanently assigned in Europe. In each case study, US Army enabling or sustaining units supported the mission of each of the other military forces.

Table 7. Research Results

Case Study	Values of the Independent Variable (extracted from secondary research questions)	Values of the Depended Variable (Extracted from QDR Goals)								Total
Operation Serval	Participation of non-US European Land Forces	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	6
		Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	
JTF Liberia	Participation of other EUCOM Service Components	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	7
		Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Operation Joint Endeavor	Participation of USAREUR assigned BCT/Support Units	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	8
		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Operation Steadfast Jazz	Participation of US Army Rotational Forces from outside EUCOM AOR	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	4
		N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	

Source: Created by author.

During Operation Joint Endeavor, USAREUR assigned brigade combat teams and support units participated in NATO's first out-of-area deployment. USAREUR provided over a third of NATO IFOR to support its allies during Operation Joint Endeavor.²⁵² USAREUR's 1st Armored Division operated as a multinational task force (Task Force Eagle) and furthered US security interests, completing all major objectives outlined by its mission.²⁵³ Immediately upon arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle deterred the political intimidation of the Bosniaks from Serbian forces. The task force helped to establish trust between the US and Bosnia-Herzegovina by enforcing the ceasefire, ensuring that Bosnian Serb forces stayed withdrawn from Bosnia, and minimized civilian casualties.²⁵⁴ The research results in this case study indicate that USAREUR combat and combat support units contributed directly to the fulfillment of QDR goals during Operation Joint Endeavor.

The analysis of Operation Serval suggests that France is a lead nation able to conduct a first entry operation without relying on any of USAREUR's brigade combat teams.²⁵⁵ The primary reasons for French success included quickly mobilized rapid reaction forces, forward military bases in Africa (notably in Chad and Senegal), and the operational readiness of the French Army.²⁵⁶ However, Serval revealed some force

²⁵²Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 41.

²⁵³Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 331.

²⁵⁴Phillips, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement*, 38; Freeman, "Operation Restore Hope vs. Operation Joint Endeavor," 4.

²⁵⁵Legrand and Durville, "French Update September-October 2013."

²⁵⁶Deseilligny, "France Mulls Mali Campaign Lessons."

projection and operational shortcomings, which indicated that French military capabilities are slightly out of balance. France operates advanced fighter aircraft, but lacks a sufficient number of airworthy refueling tankers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ISR platforms. Additionally, the French required significant airlift support to deploy and sustain approximately a medium sized brigade worth of equipment and soldiers. The USAF filled the capability gaps in two of the three shortcomings by providing unmanned aerial system (UAS) support and aerial refueling.²⁵⁷ USAREUR also lent support primarily by providing ISR, HUMINT, and SIGINT capabilities. Overall, Operation Serval offers evidence that European land forces can conduct military operations without brigade combat teams from USAREUR, but they certainly still need key support capabilities from units like the 5th Signal Command and 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. However, if NATO allies conduct a military operation that requires force projection outside of the continent of Europe, they will suffer without key capabilities such as aerial transport assets, ISR platforms, and augmented intelligence.

The case study of JTF Liberia's performance indicated that EUCOM's other component commands could accomplish small-scale humanitarian assistance and stability operations without USAREUR units. The JTF promoted stability in the EUCOM AOR by preventing the Liberian civil war from boiling over and further de-stabilizing the region. By allowing ECOMIL forces to take the lead in the operation, the JTF increased the legitimacy of ECOWAS and its military wing, ECOMIL. ECOMIL and the JTF ensured

²⁵⁷Starosta, "Mission to Mali," 50; The White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/26/fact-sheet-us-efforts-support-nato-allies-and-partners> (accessed April 30, 2014).

the flow of humanitarian relief, prevented the additional slaughter of civilians, and transferred control to the UN Stability force using a minimal US footprint without USAREUR units. Based on the results of the research, the JTF received a “yes” to all questions associated with the dependent variable with the exception of allowing the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies, which was not evaluated in the case study. Other EUCOM service components are capable of meeting the QDR goals without USAREUR’s brigade combat teams and support units, although the degree to which this applies to operations beyond crisis response and humanitarian-type missions is not clear.

According to the research from the case study of Exercise Steadfast Jazz, regionally aligned forces that rotate to participate in exercises might meet some elements of the QDR objectives, although this conclusion is very conditional because of the limited degree of participation by such forces in the exercise. Regionally aligned forces that rotate to Europe can demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO but some allies and members of congress believe more is needed to show commitment by the US. The US responded to this concern by scheduling a battalion to participate in training exercises and to position a combined arms battalion-worth of equipment (European Activity Set) at the Hohenfels training area.²⁵⁸

US Army regionally aligned forces may facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests inside the continent. SFJ demonstrated the capability of Europe’s militaries when deployed as a NATO task force without the requirement for a large number of US forces. Even a small contingent from the 1 BCT / 1 CAV staff facilitated the training event and provided valuable insight. From the information

²⁵⁸Ibid.

gathered, it seems that enablers and trainers are the most important force that the US provides to our allies during training exercises like SFJ. However, based on the execution of SFJ, it is inconclusive whether or not regionally aligned forces can deter the political intimidation of allies and partners.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The current trend of downsizing the US Army in Europe might soon mean that the EUCOM commander has to look for other ways of accomplishing QDR goals without relying on permanent US Army units located in Europe. One strategy uses US Army regionally aligned forces and relies EUCOM's other service component forces to fill gaps. Others believe that the US can rely on European forces to help achieve security goals in Europe. The purpose of the research is to determine whether or not the US can accomplish the five military strategic QDR goals in Europe without US Army brigade combat teams and support units present in Europe.

The researcher selected case studies that were intended to help frame and understand the full problem and pave the way for additional research in the subject. Chapter 5 will briefly summarize the findings of the research, interpret those findings and answer the primary research question, and discuss the implications of the results. Finally, the researcher will make some recommendations for additional study.

Summary of Findings

Chapter 4 analyzed four cases using structured, focused comparison to evaluate how the participation of different forces (independent variable) affected the achievement of QDR goals (dependent variable). The researcher developed questions to guide collection and analysis of data for each value of the dependent variable, and subsequently tallied and compared the results. Based on the research, USAREUR assigned BCTs and support units accomplished every QDR goal. However, the utilization of other forces

achieved similar results in all but one case study. Using the data compiled from each case study, the researcher attempted to answer the secondary research questions:

How do US Army units in Europe contribute to the fulfillment of QDR goals?

During Operation Joint Endeavor, USAREUR's 1st Armored Division task organized into a multinational division and conducted a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Task Force Eagle successfully completed its mission and enabled the US to accomplish each of the five QDR goals.²⁵⁹ The task force deterred the political intimidation of the Bosniaks from Serbian forces, established trust between the US and Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrated US commitment to NATO allies, and facilitated multinational operations that promoted stability within the EUCOM AOR.

Can European land forces conduct military operations outside of the continent without support from USAREUR BCTs and support units? Operation Serval demonstrated that the French Army operates effectively outside the European continent without the help of USAREUR brigade combat teams.²⁶⁰ However, Serval also revealed that the French military struggles to project its combat power forward without assistance, and relied on its allies to provide airlift and aerial refueling capabilities. At the operational level, Serval revealed that the French had large intelligence capability gaps, occurring primarily from a lack of SIGINT and ISR platforms. Overall, Serval proved that European land forces can conduct military operations without support from USAREUR brigade combat teams, but they still require key capabilities from enabling units like the 5th Signal Command and 66th Military Intelligence Brigade.

²⁵⁹Nation, *War in the Balkans*, 326.

²⁶⁰Legrand and Durville, "Armée de Terre Update September-October 2013."

Can EUCOM's other service component commands accomplish QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units? The case study conducted of JTF Liberia's performance in Liberia indicated that EUCOM's other component commands could accomplish small-scale humanitarian assistance and stability operations without assistance from USAREUR units. Based on the results of the research, the JTF received a "yes" in all of the questions that surrounding the accomplishment of QDR goals with the exception of allowing the US to demonstrate its commitment to NATO allies, which was not evaluated in the case study. From the research, it can be inferred that EUCOM service components are capable of meeting the QDR goals without USAREUR's brigade combat teams and support units in a crisis response and humanitarian assistance type missions. However, there might be a capability gap between the deployment of a small Marine Expeditionary Unit and a US Army Armor Brigade Combat Team for combat missions that require a larger force.

Can the US Army use regionally aligned forces that rotate from the United States to achieve QDR goals? According to the Steadfast Jazz case study, regionally aligned forces that rotate to Europe demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO. However, some NATO allies believe the US needs to show more commitment after the US announced its "pivot" to Asia. The exercise suggested that US Army regionally aligned forces facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests inside the continent, but not to the extent that enabling units like engineers and military trainers do. Based on the execution of Steadfast Jazz, it is inconclusive whether or not regionally aligned forces can deter the political intimidation of allies and partners. The case study revealed that

more research is needed to understand whether or not regionally aligned forces can meet the QDR's military strategic goals outlined in Europe.

The Primary Research Question

Can the US accomplish the QDR's military strategic goals in Europe without US Army brigade combat teams and support units present? The US might be able to accomplish the QDR military strategic goals in Europe without brigade combat teams. EUCOM's other service component forces effectively met each of the QDR goals during the JTF deployment to Liberia. However, this deployment represented a small-scale humanitarian and stability mission. Since a high intensity conflict was not evaluated, more research needs to be done to determine where the risks lie in fully withdrawing all Army units from Europe.

The research also infers that regionally aligned forces that rotate to Europe have the potential to meet QDR goals. Although the RAF concept needs further development, and the US Army should allocate additional resources to the RAF in order to attain the better outcome, RAF might prove to be an effective strategy. If the US Army continues to implement the RAF concept, it must provide a sufficient level of logistical support to either facilitate the movement an RAF from CONUS forward or to maintain its equipment in Europe. Moreover, as a brigade combat team, the RAF deploys with limited enabler support, and would require augmentation in key areas such as aviation, intelligence, or communications support. More research needs to be done in order to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of using regionally aligned forces, especially with regards to deployment timelines.

Another conclusion underscored by the research suggests that the European land forces might not be able to project sufficient combat power forward without US Army support units stationed in Europe. The researcher bases this conclusion largely on the French performance during Operation Serval. Although French land forces performed well overall at the tactical level, there were still some major issues with force projection and several shortfalls in French intelligence capabilities. The case study highlights a larger trend that affects the entirety of European defense: the European defense equipment market is heavily fragmented and cross-nation coordination to prevent capability loss remains relatively weak.²⁶¹ Although Europe is a defense provider, it might not be ready for a complete pullout of US Army forces.

Based on the research conducted, the US Army units in Europe that best assist our allies include the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, the 66th MI BDE, the 21st TSC, 12th CAB, and the 5th Signal Command. However, more research is required to determine what specific enablers are needed to better facilitate European military operations inside and outside the continent.

For Further Study

At the conclusion of this research project, the researcher identified several areas for further study. First, more research needs to be conducted on Regionally Aligned Forces. RAFs represent a new strategy that affects force management, deployments, and readiness of US Army forces stationed in CONUS. Specifically, a study is needed to

²⁶¹Missiroli, “Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities,” 5.

determine how RAF affects QDR goals and how to sufficiently resource the EUCOM RAF.

Second, more research needs to be done to determine what enabling units are required to facilitate the operations of US allies. The researcher didn't conduct a case study on any NATO operations, and NATO deployments are organized very differently from the deployment of an individual European country. Although the case study on Operation Serval revealed that France requires key enablers, like ISR, this research didn't identify what specific capability gaps are present when NATO forces are combined to conduct operations. Research should be conducted to determine how the US Army could restructure the types of units based in Europe to address NATO's enabler shortcomings.

The use of command posts in Europe manned by civilians rather than military personnel should be considered for an additional area for further research. A similar technique is being used in the JTF South headquarters. This produces several advantages, allowing for continuity of personnel and the reduction of expenditures. A similar technique might be used effectively in USAREUR.

Finally, more research needs to be conducted on what is required in order to deter Russia from intimidating US allies and partners. In 2006, Russia's military spending was less than that of either France or Great Britain. As of 2012, Russia's military spending exceeded that of France and Great Britain combined.²⁶² In 2010, Russia achieved a crucial geopolitical victory when then pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich assumed control as

²⁶²Missiroli, "Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities," 18.

Ukraine's president.²⁶³ Already, President Yanukovich has managed to disrupt Ukraine's 2013 entry into the EU. In 2012, Russia voted against a UN Security Council condemnation of the Bashar al-Assad government despite its attack on civilians and opposed any sanctions or intervention against the regime.²⁶⁴ The future role of Russia in Europe is uncertain—"a modernizing Russia could integrate itself into a wider international community; at the same time, a Russia which fails to build a more diversified economy and more liberal domestic order could increasingly pose a regional and global threat."²⁶⁵

Improving the Research

After conducting the research, the researcher identified several approaches that could have been conducted differently and potentially provided better results. First, the Steadfast Jazz case study was different from the other case studies in that SFJ was a training exercise and not an operational deployment. The researcher was forced to select SFJ as a case study because of limited data surrounding regionally aligned forces in Europe. Therefore, it was difficult to use a structured, focused comparison of this case study to the other case studies and draw solid conclusions. However, using the case study did underscore some potential issues with using a RAF. Additionally, the researcher

²⁶³12th Combat Aviation Brigade, *12th Combat Aviation Brigade Five-Year Plan* (Ansbach, DE: USAREUR, 2013), 47.

²⁶⁴Dmitri Trenin, "Why Russia Supports Assad," *New York Times*, February 9, 2012.

²⁶⁵*Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, ix.

intended to select case studies that spanned the full spectrum of operations from peace to war, and multinational training exercises fall within that spectrum.

The research could have included more than four cases during analysis. This could have produced more concrete results in the study rather than just an initial look at the overall problem. Had the research included additional case studies, the analysis may have revealed certain trends that could have helped the researcher provide better recommendations.

During the research process, the Department of Defense released the latest Quadrennial Defense Review Report following the research cutoff. The 2014 QDR doesn't outline specific goals for Europe as the 2010 QDR did. Finally, the researcher could have selected multiple case studies for each secondary research question in order to better identify trends.

Recommendations

Based on the results of the research, the author has several recommendations that could improve USAREUR's ability to meet QDR goals. First, the research suggests that USAREUR's remaining brigade combat teams, 173rd IBCT and 2nd SCR, should remain forward stationed in Europe. These units provide the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM commanders with more options in promoting the stability of Europe and its surrounding neighborhoods and could be more responsive than that a regionally aligned force.

While conducting this study, the researcher discovered an area of risk where there is a no rapidly deployable unit in USAREUR that could fill the gap between the deployment of a light infantry company and the deployment of an armored brigade

combat team. The company-sized 173rd Rapid Response Force provides the EUCOM commander some capability to respond to crises and stability problems within Europe and its surrounding regions, including Africa and the Middle East. Applying this same concept to 2nd SCR and creating a company-sized rapid reaction force of Stykers could fill the gap between the deployment of a light infantry company and a rotational armored force, or potentially augment the Global Reaction Force with mechanized wheeled forces.

Second, the research may indicate that there may be some benefit in pre-positioning an armored bridge combat team's worth of equipment in Eastern Europe. If the Army elected to this, it could facilitate training between USAREUR's RAF and European militaries and to emphasize US commitment to its NATO allies. The RAF currently has the ability to train using a combined arms battalion worth of equipment located in Germany at JMTTC.²⁶⁶ However, large-scale exercises, such as SFJ, typically take place in Poland. Pre-positioning an armored set in Poland provides the RAF the ability to quickly deploy personnel and operate in Poland without deploying the EAS from Germany.

A pre-positioned set of equipment in Eastern Europe might also assist in deterring Russian influence in the region. Although NATO believes the threat from nation state attack is low in Europe, Russia seems to be more at odds with NATO than in previous years. Recently, Russia's ambition has become more apparent, and it has reemerged as a regional power in Europe.

²⁶⁶European Activity Set (EAS).

Over the past decade, Russia has doubled its defense spending, seeking a quick force modernization within its military.²⁶⁷ Additionally, Russia significantly increased its military activity from the previous 10 years, resuming bomber patrols in the Atlantic and Pacific, and by conducting large-scale military exercises with the Chinese.²⁶⁸ Russian military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine further unveil the differences between Russian and Western values. If the US Army re-located an armored brigade combat team's worth equipment in Poland, the research suggests that it could reemphasize commitment to the insecure eastern countries of NATO.

Finally, the research indicates that USAREUR should tailor its enabling units to best support NATO allies.²⁶⁹ If the Army identified the capability gaps within NATO and relocated enabling units to fill gaps in intelligence and force projection capabilities, it could rapidly assist NATO in situations similar to Mali and Libya. This may provide NATO with a short-term fix until defense acquisition addresses the capability gaps.

Conclusions

In short, the analysis of the four cases suggests that the U.S. Army should maintain a forward deployed presence in Europe in order to meet QDR goals and to position the Army to support U.S. national security interests in Europe and its

²⁶⁷The Economist, “Arms and the Man: The Countries Spending the Most On Their Military, April 15, 2014,” <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/04/daily-chart-9> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²⁶⁸Nikolas Gvosdev, “Russia's Military Is Back,” *National Interest*, October 4, 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russias-military-back-9181> (accessed April 30, 2014).

²⁶⁹Indicated by the French military's shortcomings during Operation Serval.

surrounding neighborhoods. The research also indicates that now may not be the right time for the US to withdraw its land forces in Europe. The geopolitical situation in eastern Europe—especially in former states of the Soviet Union that have not joined NATO—remains in flux and highly uncertain. The remaining 32,000 US troops forward deployed in Europe serves as a constant reminder to both friend and potential foe alike of the US strategic commitment to the region.

The initial research underscores a strategic weakness of the NATO allies – one that may not lesson over time irrespective of whether or not US forces are permanently stationed in the region. Despite the fact that the overall economy of the European Union in aggregate is roughly equivalent to that of the United States, the Europeans have historically underspent the US significantly and current trends indicate that they will continue to reduce their overall defense expenditures. The dependence of the European allies upon strategic airlift, aerial refueling, ground and air based intelligence and ISR assets may continue regardless of whether or not US land forces remain on the European continent.

Forward deployed U.S. forces may serve as a catalyst to ensure that the Europeans continue to expend sufficient resources in a focused way to meet European security challenges and out of area deployments. To maintain flexibility to meet any strategic goals, the US must retain the ability to rapidly receive forces in Europe. Once abandoned, key US bases in the region will likely be lost forever. Losing forward staging bases further complicates the ability of the US to expeditiously deploy units in western and Eastern Europe and to effectively support NATO-led operations.

From the results of this initial inquiry, the recommendation to USAREUR would be to maintain the current number of brigade combat teams present in Europe, sustain the JMTC, and continue the forward basing of enabling units to assist with European-led operations or regionally aligned force deployments. USAREUR should also pre-position an armored brigade combat team set somewhere in Eastern Europe to facilitate the training of regionally aligned forces when conducting large multinational exercises, re-emphasize its commitment to NATO allies, and potentially deter any adversaries.

This research suggests that although EUCOM's organic units, the US Army's rotational forces, and US European allies cannot meet every QDR goal without US Army support, they can achieve most QDR goals without US Army brigade combat teams permanently assigned in Europe. NATO forces in Europe have the capability to field many land force divisions, especially with the inclusion of former Warsaw Pact nations into the treaty. However, NATO's capability gaps reveal a need for high tech enablers and force projection assets. The most important consideration when reducing the US Army footprint in Europe is to minimize the loss of capability among both the US services and the US European allies. Perhaps a better answer is to restructure the types of US Army units based in Europe to aid with the reception and training of regionally aligned forces, and fill in NATO's enabler shortcomings.

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